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A statistical database (SDB) publishes statistical queries (such as sum, average, count, 
etc.) on subsets of records. Sometimes by stitching the answers of some statistics, a 
malicious user (snooper) may be able to deduce confidential information about some 
individuals. When a user submits a query to statistical database, the difficult problem 
is how to decide whether the query is answerable or not; to make a decision, past 
queries must be taken into account, which is called SDB auditing. One of the major 
drawbacks of the auditing, however, is its excessive CPU time and storage 
requirements to find and retrieve the relevant records from the SDB. 
The key representation auditing scheme (KRAS) is proposed to guarantee the 
security of online and dynamic SDBs. The core idea is to convert the original 
database into a key representation database (KRDB), also this scheme involves 
converting each new user query from a string representation into a key representation 
query (KRQ) and storing it in the Audit Query table (AQ table). Three audit stages are 
proposed to repel the attacks of the snooper to the confidentiality of the individuals. 
Also, efficient algorithms for these stages are presented, namely the First Stage 
Algorithm (FSA), the Second Stage Algorithm (SSA) and the Third Stage Algorithm 
(TSA). These algorithms enable the key representation auditor (KRA) to conveniently 
specify the illegal queries which could lead to disclosing the SDB. 
A comparative study is made between the new scheme and the existing methods, 
namely a cost estimation and a statistical analysis are performed, and it illustrates the 
savings in block accesses (CPU time) and storage space that are attainable when a 
KRDB is used. Finally, an implementation of the new scheme is performed and all the 
components of the proposed system are discussed. 
VI 
ABSTRAK 
Pangkalan data statistik (SOB) menghasilkan permintaan statistik (seperti jumlah, 
purata, kiraan dan sebagainya) terhadap sesebahagian rekod. Adakalanya dengan 
menggabungkan keputusan yang didapati daripada beberapa statistik, pengguna yang 
tidak sah (pengintip) mungkin boleh mencungkil maklumat sulit ten tang seseorang 
individu. Apabila pengguna menghantar permintaan kepada pangkalan data statistik, 
masalah utama ialah bagaimanakah cara untuk mengenal pasti bahawa permintaan 
tersebut boleh dijawab atau tidak; untuk membuat keputusan, sejarah permintaan 
perlu diambil kira. Salah satu daripada kelemahan audit, ialah berlebihan masa 
diperlukan untuk unit pemprosesan pusat dan storan yang diperlukan untuk 
menyimpan dan menjalankan proses akumulasi log. Wakil kunci skim audit (KRAS) 
telah dicadangkan untuk menjamin keselamatan pangkalan data statistik secara online 
dan dinamik. Cara utama ialah dengan menukarkan pangkalan data yang asal kepada 
wakil kunci pangkalan data (KRDB), skim ini juga menukarkan setiap permintaan 
pengguna baru di dalam bentuk ayat ke dalam bentuk permintaan wakil kunci (KRQ) 
dan menyimpannya ke dalam jadual Audit Permintaan (AQ Table). Tiga peringkat 
audit disarankan untuk mengatasi serangan daripada pengintip terhadap maklumat 
sulit individu. Tambahan pula, kecekapan algoritma untuk setiap peringkat telah 
dipersembahkan, yang dinamakan Algoritma Peringkat Pertama (FSA), Algoritma 
Peringkat Kedua (SSA) dan Algoritma Peringkat Ketiga (TSA). Algoritma-algoritma 
ini membenarkan auditor wakil kunci (KRA) dengan mudah mengenalpasti 
permintaan yang tidak sepatutnya yang dikhuatiri boleh membawa kepada 
pendedahan pangkalan data statistik. Perbandingan kajian telah dijalankan di antara 
skim baru dengan cara yang sedia ada sekarang, yang dipanggil anggaran kos dan 
analisis statistik telah dijalankan, dan kami telah berjaya menunjukkan penjimatan di 
dalam blok penggunaan (CPU time) dan ruang penyimpanan yang diperlukan sewaktu 
KRDB digunakan. Akhir sekali, pelaksanaan skim yang baru ini telah dijalankan dan 
semua komponen system baru ini dibincangkan. 
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In this chapter, an introduction to database security is given, its threats and its control 
measures as well. Also, an introduction to statistical database security, methods of 
attacks, overview of solution approaches and attribute classification. In addition, the 
problem statement, objectives, methodology, scope, contributions and limitations of 
this research are discussed. 
1.2 Database Security 
The increasing development of information technology in the past few years has led 
to the widespread use of computer systems in various public and private 
organizations, such as banks, universities, companies, hospitals, libraries and so on. 
The increased reliability now offered in hardware and software technologies, coupled 
with the continuous reduction of costs, the increasing professional expertise of 
information specialists and the availability of support tools, have all contributed to 
encourage the widespread use of computing services. This has meant that more data 
than ever before is now stored and managed by computer systems, or rather by the 
tools and techniques capable of supporting and meeting these application 
requirements. Such requirements have been largely satisfied by database technology 
employing Database Management Systems (DBMS.1) flJ. 
Although the increasingly widespread use of both centralized and distributed 
databases has proved necessary to support business functions, it has also posed 
serious problems of data security. The term security refers to the protection of the 
database against unauthorized access, either intentional or accidental. In fact, damage 
in a database environment does not only affect a single user or application but rather 
the whole information system. Advances in information processing techniques (tools 
and languages) aimed at a simplification of human/machine interfaces have served to 
make databases available to different types of user; consequently more serious 
security problems arise. Therefore, in computer-based information systems, 
technologies, tools and procedures concerning security are essential both to assure 
system continuity and reliability and to protect data and programs from intrusions, 
modifications, theft and unauthorized disclosure [ l] [2]. 
1.2.1 Threats of Databases 
Database security is the mechanisms that protect the database against intentional or 
accidental threats. A threat can be defined as any situation or event, whether 
intentional or accidental, that may adversely affect a system and consequently the 
organization. A threat may be caused by a situation or event involving a person, 
action or circumstance that is likely to bring harm to an organization. The harm may 
be tangible, such as loss of hardware, software or data, or intangible, such as loss of 
credibility or client confidence. The problem facing any organization is to identify all 
possible threats which result in the loss or degradation of some or all of the following 
commonly accepted security goals: integrity, availability and confidentiality [l]-[3]. 
• Loss of integrity: Database integrity refers to the requirement that 
information be protected from improper modification. Modification in data 
includes creation, insertion, modification, changing the status of data and 
deletion. Integrity is lost if unauthorized changes are made to the data by 
either intentional or accidental acts. If the loss of system or data integrity is 
not corrected, continued use of the contaminated system or corrupted data 
could result in inaccuracy, fraud or erroneous decisions. 
• Loss of availability: Database availability refers to making objects 
available to a human user or a program to which they have a legitimate 
right. 
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• Loss of confidentiality: Database confidentiality refers to the protection 
of data from unauthorized disclosure. The impact of unauthorized 
disclosure of confidential information can range from violation of the Data 
Privacy Act to the jeopardization of national security. Unauthorized, 
unanticipated or unintentional disclosure could result in loss of public 
confidence, embarrassment or legal action against the organization. 
To protect databases against these types of threats, it is common to implement 
four kinds of control measures: access control, inference control, ±low control and 
encryption. The following section discusses each of these. 
1.2.2 Control Measures 
There are four main control measures that are used to provide security of data in 
databases [1][3]. They are as follows: 
(I) Access Control. 
(2) Inference Control. 
(3) Flow Control. 
(4) Data Encryption. 
1.2.2.1 Access Control 
A security problem common to computer systems is that of preventing unauthorized 
persons from accessing the system itself, either to obtain information or to make 
malicious changes in a portion of the database. The security mechanism of a DBMS 
must include provisions for restricting access to the database system as a whole. This 
timction is called access control and is handled by creating user accounts and 
passwords to control the login process by the DBMS. 
3 
1.2.2.2 Inference Control 
Statistical databases (SDBs) are used to provide statistical information or summaries 
of values based on various criteria. For example, a database for population statistics 
may provide statistics based on age groups, income levels, household size, education 
levels and other criteria. Statistical database users such as government statisticians or 
market research firms are allowed to access the database to retrieve statistical 
information about a population but not to access the detailed confidential information 
about specific individuals. Security for statistical databases must ensure that 
information about individuals cannot be accessed. It is sometimes possible to deduce 
or infer certain facts concerning individuals from queries that involve only summary 
statistics on groups; consequently, this must not be permitted either. This problem is 
called statistical database security. The corresponding control measures are called 
inference control measures which aim at protecting data from indirect detection. 
1.2.2.3 Flow Control 
Flow control regulates the distribution or flow of information among accessible 
objects. A flow between object X and object Y occurs when a program reads values 
from X and writes values into Y. Flow controls check that information contained in 
some objects does not flow explicitly or implicitly into less protected objects. Thus, a 
user cannot get indirectly in Y what he or she cannot get directly in X. Most flow 
controls employ some concept of security class; the transfer of information from a 
sender to a receiver is allowed only if the receiver security class is at least as 
privileged as the sender's. 
1.2.2.4 Data Encryption 
A final control measure is data encryption, which is used to protect sensitive data 
(such as credit card numbers) that are transmitted via some type of communications 
network. Encryption can be used to provide additional protection for sensitive 
portions of a database as well. The data are encoded using some coding algorithm. An 
unauthorized user who accesses encoded data will have difficultly deciphering it, but 
4 
authorized users are given decoding or decrypting algorithms (or keys) to decipher the 
data. 
1.3 Statistical Database Security 
A statistical database (SDB) is a database that is used lor statistical queries (such as 
sum, average, count, etc.) on subsets of the database entities [I]. Many government 
agencies, businesses and nonprofit organizations need to collect, analyze and report 
data about individuals in order to support their planning activities. SDBs therefore 
contain confidential information such as income, credit ratings, type of disease or test 
scores of individuals. Such data are typically stored online and analyzed using 
sophisticated database management systems (DBMSs). On one hand, such database 
systems are expected to satisfy user requests of aggregate statistics related to non 
confidential and confidential attributes. On the other hand, the system should be 
secure enough to guard against the ability of a malicious user (snooper) to infer any 
confidential information about any individual represented in the database [4]. 
Although users are only allowed to access the statistical information from an SDB, 
malicious users (snoopers) can deduce confidential information about some 
individuals by stitching the answers of some legal queries [ 5][6]. 
Protecting an SDB means preventing and avoiding statistical inference. Inference 
in SDB means the possibility of obtaining confidential information on single entity, 
by taking advantage of (sequences of) statistical queries issued against a set of entities 
stored in the SDB. When confidential information about individuals is obtained, the 
database is said to be disclosed [ 1]. 
SDBs may be online or offline. In an online SDB, users get real-time responses to 
their statistical queries. Whereas, in an offline SDB, users do not know when their 
statistics will be processed, making disclosure more difficult. Also, SDBs may be 
static or dynamic. Static SDBs do not change during their lifetime (namely, no 
insertion or deletion operations occur), and possible changes would give rise to a new 
static database. In contrast, dynamic SDBs can change continuously. Protecting a 
dynamic SDB is more complex, since variations in the database state provide 
additional information to snoopers (malicious users) [I H 4]. 
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Hence, our new auditing scheme, namely the key representation auditing scheme 
(KRAS), is proposed to protect online and dynamic SDBs from being disclosed. 
1.3.1 Methods of Attacks 
There are several kinds of threats and disclosure techniques [7], the most important of 
these threats are as follows: 
(I) Small and large query set attacks .. 
(2) Tracker attacks. 
(3) Insertion and deletion attacks. 
1.3.1.1 Small and Large Query Set Attacks 
It is easy to compromise a database that releases statistics about small and large query 
sets. To protect against this kind of attack, statistics based on small or large query sets 
must be restricted (see Figure 1.1 ). 
Query-Set-Size Control: 
A user query q is permitted only if: 
n :S I q I :S N-n 
where, Nand I q I are the database size and query-set-size, respectively. 
And n?:O is a parameter of the database. 
Restricted Permitted 




0 n-1 n N-n N-n+1 N 
Figure 1.1: Query-set-size Control 
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1.3.1.2 Tracker Allacks 
The basic idea is to pad small query sets with enough extra records to put them in the 
allowable range, and then subtract out the effect of the padding. The different types of 
trackers include: individual trackers, general trackers and double trackers [7)[8). 
(i) Individual Trackers: 
Suppose that a user knows an individual I who is uniquely characterized by a formula 
C. If C can be decomposed into the product C = C1.C2, such that count(CJ. C2) and 
count( C1) are both permitted: 
n :S count( C1. C2) :S count( C1) :S N- n 
The pair of formulas (C1, C1• C2) is called the individual tracker of I. 
Individual Tracker Compromise: 
Let C = C1.C2 be a formula uniquely identifying individual I, and let T= C1• C2 
Using the permitted queries q(C1) and q(T) the restricted query q(C) can be computed 
from 
q(C) = q(CI)- q(T) (1.1) 
(ii) General Trackers: 
A general tracker is any characteristic formula T such that 
2n :S I T I :S N - 2n 
The queries q(T) are always answerable because I T I is well within the allowable 
range [n, N-n]. 
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General Tracker Compromise: 
Let Tbe a general tracker and let q(C) be a restricted query. First calculate 
q(Al[) = q( T) + q( T) 
If I C I< n, q(C) can be computed from 
q(C) = q(C + T) + q(C + T)- q(All) (1.2) 
And if I C I > N-n, q( C) can be computed from 
q(C) = 2q(All)- q(C + T)- q(C + T) (1.3) 
If the user does not know whether the query set is too small or too large, Formula 
(1.2) can be tried first; if the queries on the right-hand side are permitted, the user can 
proceed; otherwise, Formula (1.3) can be used. Thus, q(C) can be computed with at 
most six queries. 
(iii) Double Trackers: 
A double tracker is a pair of characteristic formulas (T, lJ) for which 
TcU, 
n :S: I T I :S: N- 2n, and 
2n:S:I UI:SN-n 
Double Tracker Compromise: 
Let q(C) be a restricted query, and let (T, lJ) be a double tracker. If I C I< n, q(C) can 
be computed from 
q(C) = q(lf) + q(C+ T)- q(T)- q(C.T.lf) (1.4) 
And if I C I> N-n, q(C) can be computed from 
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q(C) = q(U)- q(C+ T) + q(T) + q(C.T.U) (1.5) 
Thus, q( C) can be computed with at most seven queries. 
1.3.1.3 Insertion and Deletion Attacks 
Dynamic databases that allow insertions and deletions of records are vulnerable to 
additional attacks. A query-set-size restriction of n can be subverted if records can be 
added to the database. If I q I < n, then dummy records satisfying the characteristic 
formula of q are added to the database; if I q I > N-n, then dummy records not 
satisfying the characteristic formula of q are added. 
1.3.2 Overview of Solution Approaches 
There are many inference control methods proposed to protect vanous database 
systems. Those methods for SOBs can be classified under three general approaches: 
data perturbation, output perturbation and query restriction. Data perturbation 
approach (see Figure 1.2) introduces noise in the data. The original SOB is typically 
transformed into a modified (perturbed) SOB, which is then made available to 
researchers. The output perturbation approach (see Figure 1.3) perturbs the answer to 
user queries while leaving the data in the SOB unchanged. While query restriction 
approach (see Figure 1.4) imposes extra restriction on queries, which includes query-
set-size control, query-set-overlap control, auditing, cell suppression and partitioning 
[4]-[6]. 
Auditing of an SOB involves keeping up-to-date logs of all queries made by each 
user and constantly checking for possible compromise whenever a new query is 
issued. Auditing has the advantages such as allowing the SOB to provide users with 
unperturbed responses that will not be disclosed. It has long believed that auditing is 
an effective tool for protection [7]. 
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This work focuses on the query restriction approach, which prevents malicious 
inferences by denying illegal queries. In particular. this research deals with auditing 
online and dynamic statistical databases problem. 
/' 
"' Queries 
./ r-... ./ I 
-Data Perturbation Pertwbed \ Researcher SDB SDB Perturbed 
' 
./ Responses 
Figure 1.2: Data Perturbation Approach 




Figure 1.3: Output Perturbation Approach 
/' Queries I \ 
SDB .\Researcher./ 
Exact Responses or Denials 
Figure 1.4: Query Restriction Approach 
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1.3.3 Attribute Classification 
Each attribute can be classified into two types: category and data attributes. The 
category attributes are used to identify and select records, and each of them contains a 
specific domain. For example, assume that the domains of the category attributes 
Gender and Department are {M, F} and {CS, EE, ME, CE, PE}, respectively. While 
the data attributes hold other information, usually numerical, for which some 
statistical queries may be desired such as Salary, Score. Income, etc [9][1 0]. 
1.4 Problem Statement 
In this research the problem of protecting an SOB is examined to prevent an SOB 
from being disclosed, through the attacks of the snoopers (malicious users) to the 
confidentiality of the individuals, and no sequence of legal queries is sufficient to 
infer protected information about any individual. When a user submits a query to 
statistical database, the difficult problem is how to decide whether the query is 
answerable or not; to make a decision, past queries must be taken into account, which 
is called SOB auditing [II]. One of the major drawbacks of the auditing is its 
excessive CPU time and storage requirements to find and retrieve the relevant records 
from the SOB. 
The problem is that statistics contain vestiges of the original information. By 
correlating different statistics, a malicious user (snooper) may be able to deduce 
confidential information about some individuals. Also, the problem in SOB protection 
is the achievement of a compromise between the privacy needs of an individual and 
the right of organizations to know and process precise and accurate information with: 
• Jess storage space, namely Jess SOB record size and number of blocks. And 
• less CPU time to retrieve the relevant records from the SOB, namely Jess 
block accesses to perform linear search, binary search and sorting. 
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This entails the right to release statistical information, while at the same time 
assuring that confidential information about the individuals represented in the SDB is 
maintained. 
1.5 Objectives 
Query auditing 1s an effective strategy for guarding the confidentiality of the 
individual in the statistical database [12], that is because it provide users with precise 
and accurate answers (unperturbed responses). Since a detailed examination of the 
inference problem reveals that we have not yet arrived at a general and acceptable 
solution [13], the objectives of this research can be summarized as: 
• To develop a new scheme for auditing online and dynamic SDBs. 
• To guarantee the security of online and dynamic SDBs by preventing 
illegal queries which could lead to disclosing the SDB. 
• To provide precise and accurate responses. 
• To reduce CPU time and storage space during query processing. 
1.6 Methodology 
This section provides all the sequence steps that have been followed in order to satisfy 
the research objectives. In general this research can be divided into three stages. 
In the first stage, a new scheme for auditing online and dynamic SDBs 1s 
developed, namely the key representation auditing scheme (KRAS). The core idea is 
to convert the original database, which is in both string and numerical representations, 
into a key representation database (KRDB). Also, this scheme involves converting 
each new user query from a string representation into a key representation query 
(KRQ) and storing it in the Audit Query table (AQ table). Three audit stages are 
proposed to repel the attacks of snoopers to the confidentiality of the individuals. 
Efficient algorithms for these stages are presented, namely the First Stage Algorithm 
(FSA), the Second Stage Algorithm (SSA) and the Third Stage Algorithm (TSA). 
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These algorithms enable the key representation auditor (KRA) to conveniently specify 
the illegal queries which could lead to disclosing the SDB. 
In the second stage, a comparative study is made between the new scheme and the 
existing methods, namely a cost estimation and a statistical analysis are performed, 
and this study illustrates the savings in block accesses (CPU time) and storage space 
that are attainable when a KRDB is used. The cost estimation comparisons between 
the KRDB and the original database are performed in terms of number of blocks, 
linear search, binary search and sorting. The statistical analysis is performed to 
compare between means and variances of the original database and the KRDB 
populations. The size of the sample drawn from each population is 13. The statistical 
analysis tests between the two populations are provided in terms of record size, 
number of blocks, linear search, binary search and sorting to examine whether the 
KRDB is better than the original database or not. 
In the final stage, the implementation of the new scheme is performed and all the 
components of the proposed system are discussed. 
1. 7 Scope of Research 
This research concentrates on protecting online and dynamic statistical databases 
(SDBs) with the least CPU time and storage space, as possible, during query 
processing. It intends to overcome one of the major drawbacks of the auditing, 
namely its excessive CPU time and storage requirements to store and process the 
accumulated logs. This research proposes the key representation auditing scheme 
(KRAS) to guarantee the security of online and dynamic SDBs. The proposed scheme 
is considered as an effective scheme to repel the attacks of snoopers (malicious users) 
to the confidentiality of the individuals. Moreover, the proposed scheme shows vast 
improvement in terms of block accesses (CPU time) and storage space that are 
attainable when a KRDB is used. 
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1.8 Research Contributions 
The contributions of this research can be summarized as: 
• The new scheme guarantees the security of online and dynamic SDBs. The three 
audit stages could prevent the SDB threats such as individual trackers, general 
trackers, double trackers and insertion and deletion attacks. Moreover, it could 
prevent the following three new types of threats which have not been discussed 
previously: 
(i) Stitching two answerable queries using two different category attributes. 
(ii) Hiding an unanswerable key representation query (KRQ), which satisfies 
the first stage conditions (FSCs) with one of the previous KRQs, inside the 
parts of the user query. 
(iii) Hiding a repeated unanswerable KRQ, which does not satisfy the third 
stage condition (TSC), inside the parts of the new user query. 
• The new scheme provides precise and accurate responses, while most of the 
previous works resort to estimate the value of the new response according to the 
distribution of the previous answered queries. 
• The new scheme, which depends directly on the key representation database 
(KRDB), saves CPU time and storage space compared to the original database. All 
schemes proposed by previous works depend directly on the original database. 
1.9 Limitations of Research 
In this research, our proposed scheme, namely the key representation auditing scheme 
(KRAS), includes only auditing count and sum statistical queries. The other statistical 
queries (or aggregate functions) such as average, min, max and median are not 
included in our proposed scheme. 
1.10 Structure of Thesis 
This thesis is structured in seven chapters. The first chapter gives an introduction to 
database security, its threats and its control measures. Also, this chapter gives an 
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introduction to statistical database security. In addition, the problem statement, 
objectives, methodology, scope, contributions and limitations of this research are 
discussed. Chapter two provides related works and mentions review of literature. 
Methodology of this research and conversion method of our proposed scheme, namely 
the key representation auditing scheme (KRAS), are illustrated in chapter three. 
Chapter four discusses the three audit stages of our proposed scheme, which is 
proposed to protect online and dynamic SDBs from being disclosed. In chapter five, a 
cost estimation for the proposed scheme is performed, and this research illustrate the 
savings in block accesses (CPU time) and storage space that are attainable when a key 
representation database (KRDB) is used. In chapter six, statistical analysis is 
performed to compare between means and variances of the original database and the 
KRDB populations. Comparisons are made between the KRDB and the original 
database in terms of record size, number of blocks, linear search, binary search and 
sorting to examine whether the KRDB is better than the original database or not. The 
last chapter is the conclusion which concludes this research and it does include some 





Problems with security of SOBs have been increasing in concern recently. This 
chapter provides related work. Related work can be divided into online and offline 
auditing. In the ojjline auditing problem, the auditor is given a series of queries and 
exact answers and the goal is to decide whether a privacy breach has occurred ex post 
facto or not. In the online query auditing problem, users get real-time responses to 
their statistical queries: given a series of queries that have already been posed, their 
corresponding answers and a new query; deny the answer if privacy may be breached 
or give the true answer otherwise. 
2.2 Online Auditing 
Problems with security of SOBs have been increasing in concern recently [14). The 
problem with online query auditing is: given a sequence of queries q 1, ... , q1.1 having 
already been asked and the corresponding answers a1, ••. , a1•1, each a1 being either the 
true answer to the query q1 or "denied" for j = I, ... , t-1. Being given a new query q1, 
prevent the answer if confidentiality might be breached or provide the true answer 
otherwise. 
Audit Expert is a practical approach based on auditing, which was proposed in 
[15]. The approach maintains a matrix used for auditing the history of users' queries 
and detects all of the possible breaches. The columns of the binary matrix represent 
database entities while, the rows represent the users' queries that have already been 
answered. When a new query is issued, the matrix is updated. A row with all zeros 
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except for an ith column is an indicator that exact disclosure of the confidential 
attribute of the corresponding entity is possible. Whereby, the answer to the new 
query should be prevented. 
According to Chin's scheme [ 15], the SDB consists of N individuals x;, l<:J<cN. 
Each individual x; is assumed to have a single protected numerical attribute value, and 
each answered query reveals a set of individual records {x1, Xm, Xn, ... } . Therefore, 
each answered query can be represented by a vector (a1, a2, ... , aN), where a;= I if x; 
is accessed in this query, and a;= 0 otherwise. The users' knowledge space KS is the 
vector space which is spanned by the set of vectors of answered queries AQ. 
Formally, KS has the following properties: 
I) Ifq 1 €AQ, then q € KS. 
2) If q'' € KS, then b*q' € KS; b is a real number. 
I \ ', ', 3) lfq 1, q2€KS, thenq1 +q2 € KS. 
4) Nothing else is inKS. 
A maximal set of non-redundant vectors of A Q can represent KS. 
It is noticed in [15] that the vectors in KS are linear independent. Therefore, the 
number of rows cannot exceed the number of columns in KS. The SDB is disclosed if 
there exists a vector of the form (0, ... ,0,1,0, ... ,0) inKS. 
Unfortunately, Chin's scheme faces problems with space explosion if the SDB is 
dynamically updated. In Chin's scheme, when an individual inserted to an SDB, a 
new corresponding column is inserted to the KS for this individual. Since the new 
individual has not yet been queried, all entries of the new column are zeros. On the 
other hand, for the protection of the individual information, when an individual is 
deleted, the corresponding column, called the dangling column, cannot be 
immediately removed from the KS matrix. 
If the dangling columns are removed immediately to reduce the size of KS, the 
deletion may cause both false alarms and security disclosure. A false alarm is raised 
when a vector with a single "!" is found in the audit matrix but the corresponding 
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individual is not disclosed. For example in Figure 2.1, the individual x3 is deleted 
from SDB. If the corresponding column c3 in the KS is removed, the audit matrix 
reports that x 5 is breached and the SDB is compromised. In fact, x5 is still unbreached 
at this time. Thus, a false alarm has been raised. 
C1 c, c, C4 C5 c1 c, C4 C5 
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
0 0 1 0 1 
X3 is deleted from the SDB 
0 0 0 1 and c3 column is removed KS= 1 1 0 1 0 KS= 1 1 1 0 
1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 
Figure 2.1: Deletion that Causes a False Alarm [5][6] 
On the other hand, security disclosure occurs when the audit matrix does not have 
any vector with a single "1 ", but the secret of an individual is disclosed. For example 
in Figure 2.2, the individual x 4 is deleted from the SDB. It seems reasonable to also 
remove the corresponding column c4. However, by removing this column, disclosure 
of confidential information will occur. 
cl C2 C3 C4 C5 
X4!S deleted from the 
C1 c, c, Cs 
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
0 0 1 0 1 
SDB and the corresp-
0 0 1 1 
KS= onding column c4 is KS= 1 1 0 1 0 removed from KS 1 1 0 0 
1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 
C1 c, c, Cs 
1 0 1 0 
(1 ,0, 1 ,0) is invoked 
KS= 0 0 1 1 
1 1 0 0 
1 ) 1 1 
Figure 2.2: Deletion that Causes Disclosure of Secret Information [5][6] 
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Assume that a new answered query, (I ,0, I ,0), is invoked in the KS after the 
deletion. The KS will be checked by the audit scheme and considered as redundant 
answerable query, which is the same as r1. As a result, KS remains unchanged and the 
query is answered. This in tum, breaches the confidential information of the deleted 
individual X4 is disclosed. 
The two examples above demonstrate that when an individual is deleted from the 
SOB, the corresponding column in the KS cannot be arbitrarily removed. Therefore, 
the size of KS will be continuously expanded without any limit when the individuals 
of a finite-size SOB are dynamically inserted, deleted or updated. It is possible 
therefore, to have a large KS for a small SOB. Substantial memory and CPU time are 
subsequently wasted in handling the columns. It is not efficient to check the entire KS 
matrix for every query, when the number of the rows and the columns in the KS is 
large. To handle this problem, Chin imposes the restriction on the scheme that it can 
only be used in static SOBs. As a result, usage of this scheme is limited. 
The authors in [5][6] proposed an algorithm to reduce the size of the KS. Chin's 
scheme can be enhanced so that it can be used in a dynamic SOB using this algorithm. 
In order to guarantee the security of an SOB, for the most part, all dangling columns 
cannot be arbitrarily removed from the KS. However, if the deletion will not cause a 
false alarm or security disclosure, it is possible to delete some of the dangling 
columns. The removable part of the audit matrix is called a related garbage set [5][6]. 
The authors in [5][6] defined the directly and indirectly related relations in a 
related garbage set as follows: in an audit matrix, an entry can only be either 'I' or 
'0'. A column and a row are directly related if their shared entry is 'I'. Indirectly 
related relation can be defined recursively. A column/row is indirectly related to a 
column/row if a directly related column/row of the former is directly/indirectly related 
to the latter. If a column/row is directly or indirectly related to another column/row, 
then they are related. Otherwise, they are unrelated. All related columns and rows 
form a related set. All elements of a related set arc related to each other, and no 
element outside of the related set can be related to any element of the set. For 
example, in Figure 2.3, r 1 and r 4 are directly related to c1; r 1 is indirectly related to r 4; 
therefore, {ct, c3, C4, r1, r2, r4} is a related set. 
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t ! ! { cl ' c3 ' c4 ' rl' '2 ' r4 } 
Cs C1 C2 C3 C4 
1 0 1 1 0 rl._ 
0 0 1 0 1 r2._ 
KS= 
0 1 0 0 0 lj 
1 0 1 0 1 r4._ 
Figure 2.3: A Related Set [5][6] 
Being unrelated to other columns and rows, the garbage columns and rows of a 
related set can be removed without affecting the subsequent security of the audit 
matrix. An algorithm FINDING_ GARBAGE based on the concept that garbage 
columns and rows are related was proposed in [6]. Whenever an individual is deleted, 
the algorithm is able to locate all the columns and rows related to the new dangling 
column. If these columns are also dangling, then these columns and rows are all 
garbage and can be safely removed. 
FINDING GARBAGE is effective m reducing the memory requirement and 
improving the performance of Chin's audit scheme. However, algorithm itself also 
introduces overhead for the deletion of individuals from an SDB. 
An implementation of the auditing strategy to avoid both exact and approximate 
disclosure was presented in [12]. The key data structure of their study is a graphical 
summary of answered queries in the form of a query map. Since the size of a query 
map could be exponential in the number of answered queries, a query restriction 
criterion was introduced to make every query map a graph. An auditing procedure on 
such a graph was also presented and the computational issues connected with its 
implementation were discussed. 
In [12], q is assumed to be the current query and it is not sensitive. To decide if q 
can be answered safely, the query-system must hypothesize a user (the "snooper") is 
knowledgeable and able to disaggregate the values of answered queries. Explicitly, 
such a user must be assumed to have such a semantic competence that he correctly 
guesses which queries are overlapping and which ones are not. Furthermore, he would 
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have to have such a computational competence that he knows how to find out all the 
aggregate data that are "inferable" from the values of answered queries. The authors 
in [12] argued that in order to repel the attacks of the snooper, the query-system will 
decide that q can be safely answered if and only if either 
-The value of q is inferable from the values of previously answered queries, or 
- There is no sensitive query among those whose values are inferable from the 
value of q and the values of previously answered queries. 
The security attacks delivered by the snooper are successfully repelled by the 
query-system if its inference model is at least as powerful as the snooper's one. Based 
on all previously answered queries and the overlapping relationships among their 
query-sets, the authors in [12] set up a system f of linear constraints which allows it 
to identify every query whose value is inferable. In the case of a large underlying 
database, the number of variables in f is always less (and is often far less) than the 
size of the database; however, it may be exponential in the number of previously 
answered queries, so that after answering a large number of queries, the query system 
will spend a lot of time deciding if the current query can be safely answered or not. To 
overcome this difficulty, the following query-restriction criterion was introduced by 
the authors in [12]. Given a set Q of answered queries and a new non sensitive query 
q with query-set R, a necessary condition for q to be safely answerable is that either 
the value of q be inferable tram Q or, for every two queries q1 and q2 from Q, 
R1nR2nR be empty, where R; is the query-set of q; (i = 1, 2). So, the number of 
variables in f is O(IQI2). The resulting auditing procedure is as follows: 
Input: A set Q of answered queries and a new query q, all of the same 
type; the query-set R of q. 
Output: A Boolean variable safe which is TRUE if and only if q can be 
safely answered given the values of all the queries in Q. 
(Initialization) Set safe :=FALSE. 
(Phase I) If the value of q is inferable from the answers to the queries in 
Q, then set safe :=TRUE and Exit. 
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(Phase II) If q violates the query-overlap constraint, then Exit. 
(Phase III) If no query whose value is inferable from Q u{ q} is sensitive, 
then set safe := TRUE. Exit. 
The computational issues connected with the implementation of the above 
auditing procedure were discussed by the authors in [12]. It was shown that the 
problems related to Phases I and II could be solved efficiently, and that the problem 
related to Phase III is provably intractable. 
The authors in [I 0] focused on sum-queries whi,:h have a response variable of non 
negative real type. They proposed a compact representation of answered sum-queries, 
called an information model in "normal form". This model allows the query-system to 
decide whether the value of a new sum-query can be safely answered or not. If not, 
then the query system will issue the range of feasible values of the new sum-query 
consistent with previously answered sum-queries. 
The authors in [I 0] argued that the confidentiality of a response variable ri can be 
attacked either (in a direct way) by an intrusive sum-query or (in an indirect way) by a 
non intrusive sum-query whose value on D, combined with the responses to 
previously answered sum-queries on D, leads to an accurate estimate of the total of ri 
for some category that is sensitive in D. In the latter case, the sum-query is called 
tricky. 
An SDB can be made secure when a new instance D is created, for each 
confidential attribute ri the sensitive categories in D are identified and each of them is 
assigned a fixed non negative number which is its protection level. Such a category S 
is considered protected at a particular time if its protection level is less than the width 
of the interval of the feasible values for the total of ri for S that are permitted by the 
responses to previously answered sum-queries. This interval is known as the 
feasibility range. The authors in [10] argued that if the current sum-query Q is 
intrusive or tricky, then a non informative response to Q will be given by the query-
system, by issuing the feasibility range for Q. This makes deciding whether Q is 
intrusive or not easy, since it is sufficient to check the presence of the category 
specified by Q in the list of the categories that are sensitive in D for ri. However, 
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deciding whether Q is tricky or not requires "auditing" the previously answered sum-
queries on D with response variable CJ and comparing the protection level assigned to 
S with the width of the feasibility range for the total of CJ for S. Q can be safely 
answered and the value of Q will be issued if each sensitive category is protected. A 
special case occurs when the value of Q is uniquely determined by previously 
answered sum-queries, that means Q is evaluable; then, Q is neither intrusive nor 
tricky and it can be safely answered. 
In much of the previous work [ 4 ][ 15]-[ 19], the auditing technique was applied 
assuming that the snooper also knows the query-set of each answered sum-query. 
Thus, enabling the snooper to write down an equation for each answered sum-query, 
whose unknowns represent the unknown values of the response variable for the tuples 
in the query-set. Consequently, the size of the snooper's model is proportional to the 
size of the instance D of the SDB, which may contain a very large number of tuples 
[20]-[25]. On the other hand, it is not realistic to hypothesize that the snooper knows 
the query-sets of the answered sum-queries. It has been suggested by some authors 
that by working with categories instead of query-sets, the snooper's model could be 
made independent of the size of the instance of the SDB. 
The authors in [I 0] stated that in order to repel the attacks of the snooper, the 
query- system will make use of its own information model, which essentially is the 
same as the snooper's model and will be constructed incrementally as the value of a 
new-sum query is issued. However, such an information model might suffer from 
certain drawbacks like redundancy, so the authors in [I 0] proposed a procedure for 
getting a "compact" representation of the information model that the drawbacks are 
missing from. This model is called a normal form. Finally, the authors addressed the 
question of whether or not a new sum-query can be safely answered by using a 
normal form of the current information model. 
The authors in [I 0] discussed that answering this question has raised some 
computational problems such as recognizing evaluable sum-queries, updating the 
information model and computing a feasibility range. The solutions of these problems 
depend on the response variable data type. Standard algebraic methods can be used to 
solve all of these problems efficiently if the response variable data type is of a real 
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type. However, if it is of a non negative type, then linear-programming or integer 
linear-programming methods can be resorted depending on the specific data type. In 
general, if the response variable is of a non negative-integer type, it is extraordinarily 
difficult from a computational viewpoint. A general theory has not yet been 
developed to solve this problem. 
The authors' work [10], only considered the case where the response variable is of 
a non negative real type. Therefore, a natural approach consists in resorting to 
standard linear-programming algorithms for example the simplex method. 
Unfortunately, the majority of these algorithms are not polynomial. Furthermore, the 
existing polynomial linear-programming algorithms such as the ellipsoid method have 
bad performances in practice. Therefore, in order to solve the computational problems 
raised by the security of the SOB, it is convenient to make a minimal use of standard 
linear-programming algorithms, so "there is considerable interest in finding 
alternative techniques". 
In [26], the online query auditing was considered. It was illustrated how denials that 
depend on the answer to the current query may leak information and the notion of 
simulatablility to tackle this problem was introduced. Simulatable algorithms for 
auditing sum queries and max queries were provided. In addition, a probabilistic 
notion of disclosure was introduced and an algorithm for auditing sum queries over 
real-valued data drawn uniformly from a bounded range under this notion was 
provided. 
The authors' work goal was to design algorithms that never allow a sequence of 
queries that breaches the data, regardless of the actual data. Essentially, a denial is 
never required for this formulation. The authors in [26] called this type of auditing 
query monitoring or, simply monitoring. In terms of utility however, monitoring may 
be too restrictive as it may prevent queries that do not breach confidentiality. This 
concern may try to be answered by constructing auditing algorithms where every 
query is checked with respect to the data set, and a denial occurs only when an 
'unsafe' query occurs. 
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The authors in [26] discussed the following question: Can an ojjline auditing 
algorithm directly solve the online auditing problem? In the traditional algorithms 
literature [27]-[30], it is stated that an offline algorithm can always be used to solve 
the online problem- the only penalty is in the efficiency of the resulting algorithm. 
In clarification of the question for the auditing context, to determine whether to 
answer q,, can we consult the data set for the true answer a, and then run an offline 
algorithm to determine if providing a, would lead to a breach? 
Surprisingly, this question was answered negatively by the authors [26]. Their 
main reason being that is denials leak information. The authors in (26] stated the 
following simple example: suppose that the underlying data set is real-valued and that 
a query is denied only if some value is fully compromised. Suppose that the snooper 
poses the first query sum(x1, x2, x3) and the auditor answers 15. Suppose also that the 
snooper then poses the second query max(x~, x2, x3) and the auditor prevents the 
answer. The denial tells the snooper that if the true answer to the second query were 
given then some value could be uniquely deduced. Note that max(x1, x2, XJ) 4 5 since 
then the sum could not be 15. Further, ifmax(x1, x2, x3) > 5 then the query would not 
have been prevented since no value could be uniquely deduced. Consequently, 
max(x1, x2, x3) = 5 and the attacker learns that x1 = x2 = XJ = 5 - a confidentiality 
breach of all three entries. The problem here is the reduction of the space of possible 
consistent solutions resulting from query denials. Moreover, this reduction is not 
explicitly accounted for in existing offline auditing algorithms. 
Posterior probabilities are computed by the new auditing algorithm by utilizing 
existing randomized algorithms. The authors in [26], to guarantee simulatability, 
made sure that the auditing algorithm does not access the data set while deciding 
whether to allow the newly posed query q, (particularly, by not computing the true 
answer to q,). Instead, the auditor draws many data sets according to the underlying 
distribution, assuming the previous queries and answers, and then computes an 
expected answer a; and checks whether revealing it would breach confidentiality for 
each of the randomly generated data sets. If the data set is not breached then the query 
is answered, otherwise the query is prevented. 
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The authors [26] believed that this definition overcomes some of the limitations. 
However, the current definition does not ensure that the confidentiality of a group of 
individuals or any function of a group of individuals is kept secure. Also, their model 
assumes that the data set is static, but in practice data is inserted and deleted over 
time. 
The online query auditing problem was considered in [31]. Auditors were constructed 
for max queries and bags of max and min queries in settings for both the partial and 
full disclosure. The authors' partial disclosure setting algorithm involves a novel 
application of probabilistic inference techniques. 
In much of the work done previously [32]-[36], compromise corresponds to the 
notion of full disclosure and occurs when the confidential data of any individual can 
be exactly determined. This is called classical compromise [37]-[41]. The authors in 
[26] introduced probabilistic compromise for bounded range data where a significant 
change in the snooper's confidence about the range of a data point constitutes a 
confidentiality disclosure. This is related to the notion of partial disclosure. A new 
algorithm was introduced by the authors in [31] for auditing max queries and bags of 
max and min queries under this definition. While in the case of classical compromise 
algorithms are known for auditing sum, average, min and max queries separately, 
auditing of combinations of these queries is hard to do. In the case of classical 
compromise, they presented an auditor for bags of max and min queries. 
For example, suppose a snooper asks for q1 = max{xa, Xb, Xc} and receives the 
answer 9. Later the snooper asks for q2 = max{xa, xh}. If the answer to q2 is less than 
9, then the snooper can infer that Xc must be 9 and q2 should be prevented. If however, 
the answer is exactly 9, answering q2 would not leak information under the classical 
definition of compromise. In this case, if the auditor does look at the answer to q2 
when deciding to prevent, a denial would immediately imply that Xc must be 9 and 
confidentiality is disclosed. Therefore, the auditor should ignore the true answer to the 
current query when making a decision. In reality, the snooper should be able to 
"simulate" the auditor and predict on his own when queries will be prevented. This 
would ensure that confidentiality is never disclosed. Thus, the algorithms that the 
authors in [31] looked for had to be online and simulatable. With classical 
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compromise, it is enough that the auditor determine if there is any possible answer to 
the current query that is consistent with past queries that could lead to breach. With 
probabilistic compromise, it is enough that the auditor determine if breach would 
occur in a large fraction of data sets drawn from the original distribution D based on 
past query answers. 
2.3 Offline Auditing 
In the problem of ojjline auditing, the auditor is given an offline set of queries q 1, ... , 
q, and true answers a1, • • • , a1 and must decide whether a compromise of 
confidentiality has occurred ex post facto or not. 
The authors in [42] proposed an auditing method based on the offline auditing 
subcube queries model used in [43]. It views an SOB as a function/from strings of k 
bits to the positive and negative integers with the keys being the domain off A query 
is always of length k bits; for example, fork= 7 a possible query could be 0** 11 *0, 
with sO's and l's (in this cases= 4) and the* standing for "do not care". The result of 
a query Q that is of length k and has sO's and l's is given by: 
Key i matches Q 
In the clinic database, for example, the key could consist of 16 bits 
xxxywwwwwwzzzzzz as follows: 
xxx is a code for the physician. 
y is a code for the patient's gender (0 =Male, 1 =Female), 
wwwwww is a code for the patient's age, 
zzzzzz is a code for the type of disease. 
Thus, the query ***1101110111001 would represent the sum of all female 
patients, independent of which physician they are with, of age 46 who have a disease 
type Ill 00 I. 
27 
The author in [ 42] stated that the amount of information gained by posing a query 
Q is given by: 
log ( L J min(lel, L -lei) , if lei,; L or lei ,; o 
log£ , if lei= L (2.1) 
0 , otherwise 
where L and 1q are the database size and the query-set size, respectively. 
It is argued by the author that minimizing this information function corresponds to 
increasing the possibility of breaching the database. Given a query of length k bits 
issued to an SDB of 2k entities, it is shown that the expected value of the information 
gained by issuing such query is: 
( )
\lk-1 
k-(k-1) + , 





, for k >I 
where pis the probability of an* occurring in any given bit position. 
(2.2) 
A summarization of the security control method proposed in [42] is as follows: 
Audit trails of the sequence of queries can be kept in the following ways: 
• Observe the actual value of p for that sequence of queries and determine if it is 
statistically significantly close to the minimum value given by (2.2). If so, there 
is a high likelihood that the user is attempting to compromise the database. 
• Evaluate the information function for each query in the sequence and study 
statistically the deviation of this value from the minimum expected value given 
by (2.2). Based on these deviations, determine the likelihood that the user is 
attempting to compromise the database. 
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Since the study is preliminary in nature, no implementation details such as the 
computational time and storage requirements have been addressed [ 4]. 
The authors in [ 44] studied the Boolean auditing problem for otlline SOBs. The data 
elements of this study are Boolean and the queries are sum queries over the integers. 
Certain complexity results were proven that suggest that there is no general efficient 
solution for the auditing problem in this case. Two algorithms were proposed: the first 
is applicable when the sum queries are one-dimensional range queries (they proved 
that the problem is NP-hard even in the two-dimensional case). The second is an 
approximate algorithm that maintains security, although it may be too restrictive. 
As an example, the authors in [ 44] considered an SOB with attributes (name, age, 
score) supporting statistical queries of the form "give me the sum of scores of all 
individuals whose age x satisfies condition C(x)", where C is an arbitrary predicate on 
the domain of age, such as 35Sx:S45. They also assumed that the projection (name, 
age) is publicly available, but the attribute score is private. The authors posed the 
following question: "What measures suffice to protect the confidentiality of the 
private information?" 
It is assumed in most work in this area that the private data are real-valued and 
essentially unbounded. However, there are certain important applications where data 
may attain discrete values, or have maximum or minimum values that are fixed a 
priori and frequently attainable. In case such as these, traditional methods for 
maintaining security are inadequate. As an example of this, if a predicate only 
samples minimum values (e.g., if all individuals whose age satisfies C(x) are achieved 
the minimum legal score), then all those individual values are definitely disclosed. 
Discreteness of values has even more subtle effects. Of course, the problems of 
discrete and bounded variables are combined by Boolean attributes. For example, 
consider an SOB with the attributes (name, age, hivpos ), where the last attribute has 
values restricted to 0 or I so, sum queries are again allowed. 
The authors [ 44] studied the mathematical and algorithmic problems that always 
arise when anyone tries to audit statistical queries on Boolean attributes. A "dual" 
situation was also studied, in which the data is continuous but the query discrete. A 
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setting in which we have a collection of (private) Boolean variables was considered 
and the results of some statistical queries to this S(:t were also considered. Queries like 
this simply specify a subset S of the variables; the response of the returned values to 
these queries are the sum of the values of all variables in S. 
An offline auditing framework was provided by the authors in [ 45] [ 46] to determine if 
a database system adheres to its data disclosure policies or not. The auditor checks 
queries accessing confidential data by formulating an audit expression that 
declaratively specifies sensitive table cells. 
A vision for a Hippocratic database suggests ten privacy principles for managing 
confidential data responsibly. Compliance is a vital principle among these. 
Compliance reqmres the database to verify that it adheres to its declared data 
disclosure policy. 
The authors in [45][46] stated the following example of Alice who gets a blood 
test done at Healthco, a company whose privacy policy stipulates that it does not 
release patient data to external parties without the patient's consent. After some time, 
Alice starts receiving advertisements for an over-the-counter diabetes test. She 
suspects that Healthco might have released the information that she is at risk of 
developing diabetes. The United States Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) empowers Alice to demand from Healthco the name of 
every entity to whom Healthco has disclosed her information. The authors also 
considered the case of Bob who consented that He:althco can provide his medical data 
to its affiliates for the purposes of research, provided his personally identifiable 
information was excluded. Later on, Bob could ask Healthco to show that they indeed 
did exclude his name, social security number and address when they provided his 
medical record to the Cardio Institute. A company may institute periodic internal 
audits to proactively guard against potential exposures. 
One approach proposed by the authors to verifying that a database adheres to its 
disclosure policies could be by supporting data disclosure auditing by physically 
logging the results of each query. There are, however, some problems with this 




it imposes a substantial overhead on normal query processing, particularly for 
queries that produce many results, and 
the actual disclosure auditing it supports is limited, since data disclosed by a 
query is not necessarily reflected by its output. 
Consider P3P [ 47] as an example of the limitations on disclosure auditing. It 
allows individuals to specify whether a particular enterprise can have access to their 
data in an aggregation. Verifying that database accesses have been compliant with 
such user preferences is not possible when only given a log of results of statistical 
queries. The authors in [45][46] addressed by stating that one might consider logging 
the tuples "read" by a query during its execution instead of its output. However, to 
determine which tuples accessed during query processing were actually breached is 
important. Moreover, a change such as this dramatically increases logging overhead 
[47]-[52]. 
A system which audits whether the database system a query in the past that 
accessed the specified data was proposed by the authors in [45][46]. During normal 
operation, using this system, the text of every query processed by the database system 
is logged along with annotations such as the time when the query was run, the user 
posing the query and the purpose of the query. Database triggers in the system are 
used to capture and record all updates to base tables in backlog tables in order to 
recover the state of the database at any past point in time. 
The authors in [45][46] stated that in order to perform an audit, audit expression 
is formulated by the auditor which declaratively specifies the data of interest. These 
audit expressions are designed to be identical to the SQL queries. This in turn allows 
to be performed at the level of an individual cell of a table. The audit query generator 
processes the audit expression. It first performs a static analysis of the expression to 
select a subset of logged queries that have the potential to breach the specified 
information. After that, the selected queries are combined and transformed into a 
single audit query by augmenting them with additional predicates derived from the 
audit expression. In this system, the audit query, expressed in standard SQL, when run 
against the backlog database yields the precise set of logged queries that accessed the 
designated data. 
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The authors [ 45] [ 46] stated the following assumptions: the combination of the 
results of a series of queries may, in subtle ways, reveal certain information. For 
example, it is discussed in statistical database literature how individual information 
can be inferred by running several aggregate queries. Moreover, database security 
literature shows how information can be leaked by using covert channels. The authors 
limited themselves to the problem of determining whether the specified data was 
breached or not by a single query when that query is considered isolated. It is also 
assumed that the queries do not use outside knowledge to infer information without 
detection. 
2.4 Summary 
In this chapter, the problem of auditing SDBs was discussed. Also, it provided related 
work and mentioned review of literature. Related work was divided into online and 
offline auditing. This chapter discussed auditing methods that have been proposed and 
used in the literature and their different aspects and researcher's view points. Query 
auditing is an effective strategy to protect the privacy of individuals in SDBs that is 
because it provides users with precise and accurate answers (unperturbed responses). 
Since a detailed investigation of the inference problem revealed that we have not yet 
arrived at a general and acceptable solution, a new auditing scheme is proposed in this 
work, namely the key representation auditing scheme (KRAS), which can guarantee 
the security of online and dynamic SDBs, provide precise and accurate responses, and 
moreover it needs less CPU time and storage space during query processing. In the 
next chapters, the new scheme will be discussed in detail. 
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CHAPTER3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND CONVERSION METHOD 
OF THE KEY REPRESENTATION AUDITING SCHEME 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides all the sequence steps that have been followed in order to 
satisfY the research objectives. Also, in this chapter a new auditing scheme is 
proposed, namely the key representation auditing scheme (KRAS), and the conversion 
method is provided to convert the original database and the user query into key 
representation database (KRDB) and key representation query (KRQ), respectively. 
3.2 Research Methodology 
This research was developed in three stages. In the first stage, a new scheme for 
auditing online and dynamic SDBs was developed. In the second stage, a comparative 
study between the new scheme and the existing methods was provided. In the final 
stage, the implementation of the new scheme was performed. Figure 3.1 depicts the 
research stages. 
3.2.1 Developing a New Scheme 
In the first stage of this research, a new scheme for auditing online and dynamic SDBs 
is developed, namely the key representation auditing scheme (KRAS). The core idea 
is to convert the original database, which is in both string and numerical 
representations and consists of t category attributes and d data attributes, into a key 
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representation database (KRDB), which consists of (l+d) cells. The t category 
attributes in the original database are converted into one cell, and the d data attributes 
are separated by the sign '.' 
I Development of the Key Representation Auditing Scheme 
Convert the New 
User Query into KRQ 
Convert the Original 
Database into KRDB 
I 
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1 . Audit Stages . 1 
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Also, this scheme involves converting each new user query from a string 
representation into a key representation query (KRQ) and storing it in the Audit 
Query table (AQ table). The key representation query contains, for each category 
attribute, either the specific category attribute class or *. The * has the intuitive 
meaning 'any', namely all category attribute classes for the corresponding column. 
3.2.1.1 Audit Stages 
Three audit stages are proposed to repel the attacks of snoopers to the confidentiality 
of the individuals. Also, efficient algorithms for these stages are presented, namely 
the First Stage Algorithm (FSA), the Second Stage Algorithm (SSA) and the Third 
Stage Algorithm (TSA). These algorithms enable the key representation auditor 
(KRA) to conveniently specify the illegal queries which could lead to disclosing the 
SDB. The three audit stages are: 
(1) The First Audit Stage: 
In the first audit stage, the new key representation query (KRQ) is prevented if it 
satisfies the first stage conditions (FSCs) with one of the previous KRQs that has 
already been posed. Otherwise, the second audit stage will be checked by the KRA. 
(2) The Second Audit Stage: 
In the second audit stage, we have two cases. In the first case, the new KRQ is 
prevented if one of its parts does not satisfy the query-set-size control. In the second 
case, the new KRQ is prevented if one of its parts satisfies the first stage conditions 
(FSCs) with one of the previous KRQs that has already been posed. If the new KRQ 
is not prevented in this stage, the third audit stage will be checked by the KRA. 
(3) The Third Audit Stage: 
In the third audit stage, we also have two cases. In the first case, the new KRQ is 
permitted if it is equal to one of the previous KRQs that has already been posed, and 
satisfies the third stage condition (TSC). In the second case, the new KRQ is 
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permitted if one of its parts is equal to one of the previous KRQs that has already been 
posed, and satisfies the third stage condition (TSC). 
3.2.2 Comparative Study between the New Scheme and the Existing Methods 
In the second stage of this research, comparisons are made between the new scheme 
and the existing methods, namely a cost estimation and a statistical analysis are 
performed, and this study illustrates the savings in block accesses (CPU time) and 
storage space that are attainable when a KRDB is used. 
3.2.2.1 Cost Estimation 
The cost estimation comparisons between the KRDB and the original database are 
performed in terms of number of blocks, linear search, binary search and sorting. This 
work applies the cost estimation comparisons between the KRDB and the original 
database based on three case studies of statistical databases (SDBs) and their 
corresponding key representation databases (KRDBs). 
3.2.2.2 Statistical Analysis 
The statistical analysis is performed to compare between means and variances of the 
original database and the KRDB populations. The size of the sample drawn from each 
population is 25. The comparisons between the two populations are provided in terms 
of record size, number of blocks, linear search, binary search and sorting to examine 
whether the KRDB is better than the original database or not. This statistical analysis 
uses t-test and F-test to evaluate the differences in means and variances, respectively, 
between the two populations. This study tests the null hypothesis, that there will be no 
significant difference between the two populations' means/variances, against the 
alternative hypothesis, that there will be a significant difference between the two 
populations' means/variances. 
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3.2.3 Implementation of the New Scheme 
In the final stage of this research. the implementation of the new scheme is performed 
and all the components of the proposed system are discussed. And by applying the 
three audit stages, the proposed system is capable of conveniently specifying whether 
the user query is answerable or not. 
3.3 Conversion Method of the Key Representation Auditing Scheme 
In this section, a new auditing scheme is proposed, namely the key representation 
auditing scheme (KRAS), and the conversion method is provided to convert the 
original database and the user query into key representation database (KRDB) and key 
representation query (KRQ), respectively. In addition, three case studies of original 
databases and their corresponding KRDBs are provided. Moreover, some examples of 
user queries and their corresponding KRQs are presented. 
3.3.1 Statistical Database Model 
Assume that the original database D, which in both string and numerical 
representations, contains N records of individuals. Each record has t category 
attributes and d data attributes (AI, Az, ... , A" At+ I, At+2, ... , At+ct) [53]-[57]. 
Each category attribute Aj (1:99) has IAil possible values, namely the domain of 
each category attribute has IAil classes. For example, the attribute Gender whose two 
possible values (or classes) are Male and Female. Let 8ikj be the domain of the 
category attribute Aj (l<::i<::N; J<:kSIAd; 1:99), where the subsets i, k and j represent 
the record number, the category attribute class and the attribute number, respectively. 
Thus, the domains of the t category attributes are as follows: 
Domain(A2) = { 8i!2, 8m, ... , 8,1Azlz} 
Domain(Aj) = {8iij, 8,2J, ... , 8iiAM 
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While each data attribute Aj (t+l~9+lf) holds other information, usually 
numerical, for which some statistical queries may be desired such as Salary, Score, 
Income, etc. Let Vii (l:siSN; 1~9/) be the values of the d data attributes (At+ I, A1+2, ... 
, At+d)· Thus, the values of the d data attributes are as follows: 
3.3.2 Key Representation Database (KRDB) 
The core idea of this work is to convert the original database D into key representation 
database D1, which consists of (l+lf) cells. The .r category attributes in the original 
database D are converted into one cell, and the d data attributes are separated by the 
sign '.'. Each category attribute value 8,ki (l:si~N; l:Sk:SIAil; 1~9) in the original 
database D is replaced by its category attribute class (k = I, 2, . . . , or IAJil· The 
converted (l+lf) cells are as follows: 
U;1Ui2 ... U;,.V;J.V;z ..... V;d 
where, Uii (l:siSN; 1~9) represents the category attribute class corresponding to the 
category attribute Aj for the record number i. And Vii (l:siSN; 1~9/) represents the d 
data attributes for the record number i separated by the sign '.'. 
Figure 3.2 shows the original database conV(!rsion algorithm, which convert the 
original database into KRDB. 
For example, let t = 4 and d = 2, also assume: the following information describe 
the record number i in the original database D: 
(8 il), 8 i12• 8 i53, 8 i34, 2000, 1500) 
This record is converted into (l+lf) cells as follows: 
3153.2000.1500 
where: 
• 3, I, 5 and 3 are the classes of the first, second, third and fourth category 
attributes, respectively. 
38 
• 2000 and 1500 are the values of the tirst and the second data attributes, 
respectively. 
Procedure Find_ Category_ Attribute_ Class (i,j, Xi,i) 
Begin 
end; 
For e = I to I Ai I 
Begin 
end; 
if (Xu == ej,D 
return( e); 
endif; 
Procedure Convert_Origina!DB_to_KRDB (N, t, d) 
Begin 
End; 
Fori= I toN 
Begin 
end; 
For j = I tot 
Begin 
end; 
K = Find_ Category_ Attribute_ Class (i,j, Xi,i); 
U =K· 1,] ' 
For j = t+ I to t+d 
Begin 
V·=X · 1,) l,J, 
end; 
f, Figure 3.2: The Original Database Conversion Algorithm 
3.3.3 Key Representation Query (KRQ) 
Also, this scheme involves converting each new user query q from string 
representation into key representation query q1 and storing it in the Audit Query table 
(AQ table). The key representation query q1 contains, for each category attribute A1 
(1"99), either the specific category attribute class or the sign *. The * has the intuitive 
meaning 'any', namely all category attribute classes for the corresponding column. 
Also, the key representation query q1 contains, for each data attribute Aj (t+l-:j<g+d), 
the value of the data attribute itself, a logical formula over its value or over any value 
with the same data type using the relational operators(>.:>:,<,<::,=), or the sign*. 
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The key representation query q1 will be as follows: 
where: 
• UJ = 1 I 2 I ... IIAj I I * ' (1 <:jSt) 
• VJ = Vij I f(V) I * ' ogsN; 1<:jS4), f(V) logical formula over any value v 
with the same data type. 
Figure 3.3(a) and Figure 3.3(b) show the user query conversion algorithm, which 
convert each new user query into KRQ. 
Figure 3.4 depicts the statistical database model for the key representation 
auditing scheme. 
Procedure Find_ Category_ Attribute_ Class (j, C) 
Begin 
End; 
For e = I to I Aj I 
Begin 
end; 
if (C == e,J) 
return( e); 
endif; 
Procedure Convert_UserQuery_to_KRQ (t, d,p) 
Begin 
Form= 1 top 
Begin 
GreenNS _ ctr = 0, RedNS _ ctr 0 ' 0; 
For j =I tot 
Begin 
if (Aj ==NULL) 
u·= '*'· I ' 
NS(j) = 0; 
else 
K = Find_Category_Attribute_Class (j, Val(Aj)); 
u=K J ' 
read GreenNS; 
if (GreenNS == 0) 
read RedNS; 
ifRedNS == 0 
NS(j) = 0; 
else 













if (RedNS _ ctr == I) 
//Red Not Sign should be at least for two categories 
exit; 
endif; 
for j = I to t+d 
Begin 
end; 
if (Aj ==NULL) 
else 
v·= '*'· J ' 
read op; 
if(op in{"=','>','>=','<',<=','<>'}) 
read value I; 
Vj = op.value I; 
elseif(op in{'[]','(]','[),'()'}) 




Figure 3.3(b): The User Query Conversion Algorithm 
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Statistical Databas< Model 





















Exact R sponse 
or D nials 
Figure 3.4: Statistical Database Model for the Key Representation Auditing Scheme 
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3. 3. 3.1 The Relational Operators in KRQ 
The relational operators in the key representation query (KRQ) are signed as follows: 
Table 3.1: The Relational Operators in KRQ 
t •i! >]!]················ ., ••. ; ··•····.··. I X})J'!lSS~OJI. i • •.• . • .. • Th ' ..•.. ' · .. ..,es·~~~q 
Greater than > 
---7 
Greater than or equal > 
-
Less than < ~ 






3.3.3.2 The Logical Operators in KRQ 
The logical operators in the key representation query (KRQ) are signed as follows: 
Table 3.2: The Logical Operators in KRQ 
1 





3.3.3.3 Examples ofKRQs 
Lett= 4 and d = 2, and consider the following user queries: 
(1) q1 : (A2=e24)•(A4=e4,)•(As=2500) 
(2) q2: (A,=812)•(A2=821)•(A6>3000) 
(3) q3: (A2=e2•)•(AJ=eJ4)•(2000<As<4000) 
(4) q4: not((AJ=832)•(A4=843))•(A6:S2000) 
(5) qs : (A.=812)•(A2=e21)+(A,=en)•not(A2=e23) 
The key representation queries (KRQs) for tht: above string representation queries 
will be as follows: 
(1) q!l: *4*1.2500 •• 
q\ . -----7 (2) 2. 21**. * .3000 
(3) I q]: * 14 * .(2000,4000). * 
-
--(4) q\ . **23.*.2000 4. 
(5) q\ . 5 • 21 **.*.* + 33**.*.* 
3.3.4 Audit Query Table (AQ table) 
The Audit Query table (AQ table) is used in our proposed scheme for storing each new 
legal key representation query q\ This table consists of the following columns: 
• The key representation query: q1 
• The query result (aggregation result): R(q1) 
• The query-set size: I q1 I 
• The latest query-set size: Ll q1 I 
Since the SDB in this scheme is online and dynamic, the individuals' records of an 
SDB need to be inserted, deleted and updated dynamically. Consequently, this scheme 
uses the latest query-set size column Llq11 to deal with the previous key representation 
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quenes q's, which were legal. After updating the SDB, the snooper may repeat 
invoking one of the previous queries again. By using the value of this column, the 
KRA can decide whether or not this query could lead to the disclosure of the SDB. 
3.3.5 Examples of SDB and its Corresponding KRDB 
In this section, three examples, namely three case studies, of statistical databases 
(SDBs) and their corresponding key representation databases (KRDBs) are provided. 
Also, examples of user queries which have been converted into key representation 
queries (KRQs) are presented in this section. 
3.3.5.1 The First Example 
A typical example of an SDB can be illustrated based on the data held in Table 3.3. In 
the SDB, the salary of specific individual should not be disclosed. Table 3.3 shows 
the original database D summarizing confidential information about employees. Each 
employee is classified in three categories and has one data attribute. The possible 
category attributes' values are as follows: 
• Gender: {M, F} = { 1, 2} 
• Dept: { CS, EE, PE} = { 1, 2, 3} 
• Level: {BSc, MSc, PhD}= {1, 2, 3} 
The possible data attribute's values are: 
• Salary (in$): any integer';> 0 
Table 3.4 shows the key representation database (KRDB) D\ which is the 
conversion result of the original database D by converting the three category attributes 
(Gender, Dept and Level) into one cell (Ui!U,2U,3), and the data attribute value Vii is 
separated by the sign '.'. The converted two cells are as follows: 
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where, the cell U;tU;zU;J represents the category attributes' classes corresponding to 
the category attributes (Gender, Dept and Level) and V; 1 represents the value of the 
data attribute (Salary). 
Table 3.3: Example I- The Original Database D 
R¢~N9 •.I.·. >iN~'?T' •. ,:. .Gender ,. J>eJ1~:·· Level' ~~J~D' 
,·T.->"_<}'_U_<_L',_:;_,:·: _, , •....... · ... •·.· . '' ,,',' 
1 Adil M cs MSc 200 
2 Orner M EE MSc 150 
3 Sara F EE MSc 250 
4 Sari a F cs MSc 150 
5 Samy M PE MSc 180 
6 Maisoon F PE BSc 220 
7 Gasim M cs MSc 100 
8 Ahmed M EE MSc 180 
9 Fatima F cs PhD 30 
10 Nasir M PE BSc 200 
II Mahasin F EE MSc 250 
12 Khalid M cs PhD 30 
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Examples of user queries qs (using the statistical query sum) for this database, 
which are converted into key representation queries (KRQs) q1s, are as follows: 
Table 3.5: Example I- Examples of User Queries Converted into KRQs 
, . User query q · 
. 
KR.Qq! .. Queryset · . I.Ariswer lq'l·• 
· ... · . 
. ' . ·' .... 
. ..... ·.······ . '· 
. , .. 
· .. 
' '' '" 
q1 = M.CS 11 *. * {I, 7, 12} 330 3 
qz = F.(CS+EE).MSc 212. * + 222. * {3,4,11} 650 3 
-
-
{I, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 
1760 10 q3=M+CS 1**.*+*1*.* 10, 11, 12} 
q4 = Salary>200 ---';> {3, 6, 11} 720 3 
***.200 
qs = Salary::OI50 
-
{2, 4, 7, 9, 12} 460 5 
*** .150 
q6 = F .CS.MSc 212. * {4} 150 I 
-
{I, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 
q7= F.CS.MSc 212. * 1790 II 9, 10, II, 12} 
3.3.5.2 The Second Example 
A second example of an SOB can be illustrated based on the data held in Table 3.6. In 
the SOB, the grade-point (GP) of a specific student should not be disclosed. Table 3.6 
shows the original database D summarizing confidential information about students. 
Each student is classified in two categories and has two data attributes. The possible 
category attributes' values are as follows: 
• Gender: {M, F} ={I, 2} 
• Dept: {CS, Math}= {I, 2} 
The possible data attributes' values are: 
• Age: 18 ::0 Age ::0 25 
• GP: 0 ::0 GP ::0 4 
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Table 3.7 shows the key representation database (KRDB) D1, which is the 
conversion result of the original database D by converting the two category attributes 
(Gender and Dept) into one cell (Ui1Ui2), and the data attributes' values (V;~, V;z) are 
separated by the sign '.'. The converted three cells are as follows: 
where, the cell Uil Ui2 represents the category attributes· classes corresponding to the 
category attributes (Gender and Dept). And the cells V11.Vi2 represent the values of 
the data attributes (Age and GP). 
Table 3.6: Example II- The Original Database D 
RecNo Name Gender Dept Age GP 
1 Ahmed Male cs 20 2 
2 Sara Female cs 18 4 
3 Orner Male Math 21 3 
4 Gasim Male Math 21 2 
5 Fatima Female Math 20 1 
6 Adil Male Math 21 2 
7 Maisoon Female Math 20 1 
8 Nasir Male cs 21 2 
9 Khalid Male cs 19 2 
10 Ebrahim Male cs 18 2 
11 Jaafar Male cs 19 4 
12 Mahasin Female Math 19 4 
13 Samy Male cs 23 4 
14 Fady Male Math 22 4 
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Table 3.7: Example II- The Key Representation Database (KRDB) D1 
















Examples of user queries qs (using the statistical query sum) for this database, 
which are converted into key representation queries (KRQs) q1s, are as follows: 
Table 3.8: Example II- Examples of User Queries Converted into KRQs 
User query q KRQq' Query set Answer I q'l 
q1 = M.CS II.*.* {I, 8, 9, 10, II, 13} 16 6 
q2 = F.(CS+Math) 21. *. * + 22. *. * {2, 5, 7, 12} 10 4 
-
{I, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 
- 33 13 q3=M+CS !*.*.* + *1.* .* II, 12, 13, 14} 
q4= Age> 20 -7 {3, 4, 6, 8, 13, 14} 17 6 ** .20. * 
qs=GP:<:3 
-
{I, 3, 4, 5, 6. 7, 8, 9, 10} 17 9 
**. * .3 
q6= F.CS 21.*.* {2} 4 I 
--
-
{I, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 
q7 = F.CS 21.* .* 33 13 11,12,13,14} 
3.3.5.3 The Third Example 
The third example of an SOB can be illustrated based on the data held in Table 3.9. In 
the SOB, the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) and the Grade-Point (GP) of a specific 
student should not be disclosed. Table 3.9 shows the original database D summarizing 
confidential information about students. Each student is classified in three categories 
and has two data attributes. The possible category attributes' values are as follows: 
• Gender: {Male, Female}= {I, 2} 
• Major: {Bio, CS, EE, Psy} ={I, 2, 3, 4} 
• Class: { 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981} = {I, 2, 3, 4} 
The possible data attributes' values are: 
• SAT: 300 :<: SAT :<: 800 
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• GP: 0 :0 GP :0 4 
Table 3.10 shows the key representation database (KRDB) D 1, which is the 
conversion result of the original database D by converting the three category attributes 
(Gender, Major and Class) into one cell (Uii U1zlJiJ), and the data attributes' values 
(Vi1, Vi2) are separated by the sign'.'. The converted three cells are as follows: 
where, the cell Ui1 Uiz1Ji3 represents the category attributes' classes corresponding to 
the category attributes (Gender, Major and Class) and the cells Vi1.Vi2 represent the 
values of the data attributes (SAT and GP). 
Table 3.9: Example III- The Original Database D 
RecNo .·.· Name Gend.er Major'•· Chtss: SAT GP 
. . ·· .. .··, 
I Allen Female cs 1980 600 3.4 
2 Baker Female EE 1980 520 2.5 
3 Cook Male EE 1978 630 3.5 
4 Davis Female cs 1978 800 4.0 
5 Evans Male Bio 1979 500 2.2 
6 Frank Male EE 1981 580 3.0 
7 Good Male cs 1978 700 3.8 
8 Hall Female Psy 1979 580 2.8 
9 lies Male cs 1981 600 3.2 
10 Jones Female Bio 1979 750 3.8 
11 Kline Female Psy 1981 500 2.5 
12 Lane Male EE 1978 600 3.0 
13 Moore Male cs 1979 650 3.5 
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In this chapter all the sequences and several stages that have been followed in this 
research to successfully accomplish the objectives were clearly discussed. In general, 
this research was divided into three stages. In the first stage, a new scheme for 
auditing online and dynamic SOBs was developed. In the second stage, comparisons 
were made between the new scheme and the existing methods. In the final stage, the 
implementation of the new scheme was performed. Also, the new auditing scheme 
was discussed, namely the key representation auditing scheme (KRAS), which was 
proposed to protect online and dynamic SOBs from being disclosed. Also, this chapter 
provided the statistical database model for the proposed scheme, the key 
representation database (KRDB) and the key representation query (KRQ). Moreover, 
three case studies of original SOBs and their corresponding KRDBs were provided. In 
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addition, some examples of user queries and their corresponding key representation 
queries (KRQs) were presented. 
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CHAPTER4 
AUDIT STAGES OF THE KEY REPRESENTATION AUDITING 
SCHEME 
4.1 Introduction 
This work provides presentation of an auditing method that can be used to repel the 
attacks of the snooper to the confidentiality of the individual data in the SDB. In this 
chapter, three audit stages are proposed to protect online and dynamic SDBs from 
being disclosed. Also, efficient algorithms for these stages are presented, namely the 
First Stage Algorithm (FSA), the Second Stage Algorithm (SSA) and the Third Stage 
Algorithm (TSA). These algorithms enable the key representation auditor (KRA) to 
conveniently specify the illegal queries which could lead to disclosing the SDB. 
4.2 Audit Stages 
Before implementing the audit stages, the new user query-set size must fall in the 
allowable range [ n, N-n ], for some positive integer n. That is, the new user query q 
must satisfy the query-set-size control [ 1]. 
Query-Set-Size Control: 
A user query q is permitted only if: 
n <:: I q I <:: N-n, 
Where, n2:0 is a parameter of a database. 
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Given a sequence of key representation queri,~s q11, q1z, ... , q1h that have already 
been posed and stored in the Audit Query table (AQ table), and a new key 
. I 
representatiOn query q h+ 1: 
'(l:si~h) 
To decide whether the new key representation query q1h+t should be answered or 
not, the following audit stages should be applied [54]-[57]. 
4.2.1 The First Audit Stage 
Consider a sequence of key representation queries q\ (I :si~h) and a new key 
representation query q1h+l· For the sake of simplicity, we shall write Xij (l:si~h; 
1-:jSt+d) to denote both Uij (l:si~h; 1-:jSt) and Vii (l:si~h; 1-:j~. 
'(l:si~h) 
It is assumed that a= i and b = h+l, if I q\ 1>1 q1h+tl· Otherwise, a= h+l and b = i. 
Accordingly, the new key representation query q1h+t should be prevented if the KRA 
found q11 (for some i € { 1, 2, ... , h}) satisfies the following conditions: 
The First Stage Conditions (FSCs): 
A new KRQ q1h+t is prevented if: 
(ii) Each Xbj (1-:jSt+d), in q1b, corresponds, in q1,, to either * or Xaj where X,.i = 
Xbj, namely each cell Xaj should not correspond to a different value in q1b cells. 
And 
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(iii) The result query q1, returns one record, where q1, can be computed by 
subtracting the cells of the query q1b from its corresponding cells in q13 , 
excluding the common cells between them. 
The proposed First Stage Algorithm (FSA) is shown in Figure 4.1, and Figure 4.2 
depicts the flow chart for the first stage conditions (FSCs ). 
Individual trackers can be prevented by using the first audit stage; examples 4.1, 
4.4 and 4.5 below show how the proposed scheme could prevent this attack. 
Moreover, example 4.2 shows that this stage could prevent another new threat which 
can occur by stitching two answerable queries using two different category attributes. 
On the other hand, Example 4.3 shows that this stage permits the query which does 
not satisfy FSCs. 
Example 4.1: 
Based on Table 3.3 and Table 3.4, assume that the following query has already been 
posed and stored in the AQ table: 
then, q11 = 2**.* = {3, 4, 6, 9, 11} 
And the new user query is posed as follows: 
qz = F.CS.MSc 
I -
then, q2 = 212.* = {3, 6, 9, II} 
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{ I I I } AQ = q ,, q2, ... , qh 
//q1; = X;,Xi2 .. . X;,.X; t+I·X; t+2· ... • X; t+ct 
. 'I • 
Procedure First_ Stage (qh+i) 
Begin 
End; 
Prevent = False; 
For each q\ in AQ 
Begin 
end; 
if (ABS(I q\ H q1h+tl) == I) 





b = h+l; 
a= h+l; 
b = i; 
For each Xij in q\ 
Begin 
if (Xbj == Xaj) 
Prevent= True; 
elseif ((Xbj !='*')and (Xaj == '*')) 
Prevent= True; 




Prevent = False; 
break; 
end· 
I q1, I= I q1• H q1b I; 
if ((Prevent== True) and (I q1, I== I)) 
Inform the SOB to prevent q1h+I; 
return Prevent; 
end if; 
if (Prevent == False) 
endif; 
Inform the SOB to permit q1h+ 1; 
return Prevent; 













j = j +I 
Figure 4.2: Flow Chart for the First Stage Conditions (FSCs) 
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End 
By using the KRA, the new user query q12 should be prevented, since (i) lq\ I - lq12l 
=I, and (ii) each X2j (I~Yf), in q12, corresponds, in q1 ~, to either* or X1j where X2j = 
Xij (l~Yf). And, (iii) by subtracting the cells of the query q12 from its corresponding 
cells in q\, excluding the common cells between them, the result query q1, would 
return one record (see Appendix A). 
Example 4.2: 
Based on Table 3.3 and Table 3.4, assume that the following query has already been 
posed and stored in the AQ table: 
then,q11 =*3*.*={5,6, 10} 
And the new user query is posed as follows: 
q2 = BSc 
then, q12 = **!.* = {6, 10} 
By using the KRA, the new user query q12 should be prevented, since (i) lq11l - lq12l 
= I, and (ii) each X2j (l~Yf). in q12, corresponds, in q11, to either* or X 1j where X2j = 
X1j (l~Y/). And, (iii) by subtracting the cells of the query q12 from its corresponding 
cells in q11, the result query q1, would return one re,:ord (see Appendix A). 
Example 4.3: 
Based on Table 3.3 and Table 3.4, assume that the following query has already been 
posed and stored in the AQ table: 
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then, q11 = **1.* = {6, 10} 
And the new user query is posed as follows: 
q2 = M.CS 
then, q1z = II*.* = {I, 7, 12} 
By using the KRA, the new user query q12 should be permitted, since by subtracting 
the cells of the query q11 from its corresponding cells in q12, the result query q1, would 
return more than one record (see Appendix A). 
q\=q12 -q11 =11*.*-**1.*= lll.* ={!, 7, 12} • 
Example 4.4: 
Based on Table 3.6 and Table 3.7, assume that the following query has already been 
posed and stored in the AQ table: 
then, q11 =*!.*.*={I, 2, 8, 9, 10, II, 13} 
And the new user query is posed as follows: 
q2 = F.CS 
then, q1z = 2!.*.* ={I, 8, 9, 10, II, 13} 
By using the KRA, the new user query q12 should be prevented, since (i) lq11l- lq12l 
= I, and (ii) each X2i (l<j-::4), in q12, corresponds, in q11, to either* or X 1J where X 1j = 
X2i (I <J-::4). And, (iii) by subtracting the cells of the query q12 from its corresponding 
cells in q11, excluding the common cells between them, the result query q1, would 
return one record (see Appendix A). 
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Example 4.5: 
Based on Table 3.6 and Table 3.7, assume that the following query has already been 
posed and stored in the AQ table: 
q1 = Math.Age=21 
then, q11 = *2.21. * = {3, 4, 6} 
And the new user query is posed as follows: 
q2 = Age=21 
then, q12 = **.21.* = {3, 4, 6, 8} 
By using the KRA, the new user query q12 should be prevented, since (i) lq12l - lq1Ji 
=I, and (ii) each X 1j (1:1-::4), in q11, corresponds, in q12, to either* or X2j where X2j = 
X 1j (1:1-::4). And, (iii) by subtracting the cells of1:he query q11 from its corresponding 
cells in q12, the result query q1, would return one record (see Appendix A) . 
• 
4.2.2 The Second Audit Stage 
If the new key representation query q1h+ 1 consists of p parts, for some positive integer 
p. 
I I I I q h+l = q h+l,l + q h+l,2 + ". + q h+!,p, 
the query will need to be checked by the second audit stage. 
The proposed Second Stage Algorithm (SSA) is shown in Figure 4.3(a) and 
Figure 4.3(b). For this stage we have the following two cases: 
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4.2.2.1 The Second Audit Stage: Case 1 
If one of the q 1h+l parts returns one record, namely lq1h+t.kl =I (for some k € {I, 2, ... , 
p}), the new key representation query q 1h+l should be prevented. This is because if the 
KRA permitted this query and the snooper poses another query q1h+Z with the same 
parts of q 1h+l excluding the kth part, then he can deduce the individual's information 
by subtracting the answers of the two queries. 
But if at least two of its parts return one record for each part, namely lq1h+J.kl = 1 
and lq1h+Jj = I (for some k, j € {I, 2, ... , p} and k t j), the new key representation 
query q1h+ 1 should be permitted. 
General trackers and double trackers can be prevented by using the second audit 
stage, examples 4.6 and 4.7 below show how the proposed scheme can prevent the 
general tracker. 
Example 4.6: 
Based on Table 3.3 and Table 3.4, the query q = F.CS.MSc uniquely identifies the 
employee "Saria". A general tracker's query set size must fall in the range [2n, N-2n] 
[7][8], that is [4, 8] with n=2 and N=l2. The formula T = M qualifies as a general 
tracker since I T I = 7. The snooper applies the following equation to discover S, the 
total sum of all salaries. 
S = sum(M; Salary)+ sum(M; Salary) 
= 1040 + 900 = 1940 
A tracker is obtained by defining: 
• A query: 
q 1 = F.CS.MSc + M 
then, q11=212.* + 1**.* = {4} +{I, 2, 5, 7, 8, 10, 12} 
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={I, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 12} 
sum(q1; Salary)= 1190 
• And, a second query: 
qz = F.CS.MSc + M 
then,q12 =212.* + l**.*= {4} + {3, 4, 6, 9, II} 
= {3, 4, 6, 9, II} 
sum(q2; Salary)= 900 
The forbidden query q = F.CS.MSc can be computed using the following formula: 
sum(q; Salary)= sum(q1; Salary)+ sum(qz; Salary)- S 
= 1190 + 900- 1940 = !50 • 
r:JT' This is Saria's Salary. 
By using the KRA, the query q11 = 212. * + I**.* should be prevented, since one of 
I I -its parts q 1.1 = 212. * returns one record. Also, the query q 2 = 212. * + I**.* should be 
prevented, since one of its parts q12.1 = 212.* returns one record. 
Example 4. 7: 
Based on Table 3.6 and Table 3.7, the query q = F.CS uniquely identifies the student 
"Sara". A general tracker's query set size must fall in the range [2n, N-2n] [7][8], that 
is [4, 10] with n=2 and N=l4. The formula T = M qualifies as a general tracker since 
IT I = I 0. The snooper applies the following equation to discoverS, the total sum of all 
GPs. 
S = sum(M; GP) + sum( M ; GP) 
=27+ 10=37 
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A tracker is obtained by defining: 
• A query: 
q1 =F.CS +M 
then, q11 = 21. *.*+I*.*.* 
= {2} +{I, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, II, 13, 14} 
={I, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, II, 13, 14} 
sum(q1; GP) = 31 
• And, a second query: 
q2 = F.CS + M 
then, q12 = 21.*.* + l*.*.* = {2} + {2, 5, 7, 12} 
= {2, 5, 7, 12} 
sum(q2; GP) = 10 
The forbidden query q = F .CS can be computed using the following fonnula: 
sum(q; GP) = sum(q1; GP) + sum(q2; GP)- S 
=31+10-37=4 • 
r:Jr This is Sara's GP. 
By using the KRA, the query q11 = 21. *. * + I*.*.* should be prevented, since one 
of its parts q\ 1 = 21. *. * returns one record. Also, the query q12=21. *. * + l*. *. * should 
be prevented, since one of its parts q12.1 = 21. *. * returns one record. 
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4.2.2.2 The Second Audit Stage: Case 2 
If one of the q1h+I parts, say q1h+I.k (for some k € {I, 2, ... , p} ), satisfies the first stage 
conditions (FSCs) with one of the previous KRQs .. say q11 (for some i € {I, 2, ... , lz}), 
that has already been posed and stored in the AQ table. And if: 
(1$<0[! andj # k) 
then, the new key representation query q1h+ 1 should be prevented. That is because if 
the KRA permitted this query and the snooper poses another query q1h+l with the same 
parts of q1h+I excluding the kth part, then he can deduce the individual's information 
by subtracting the answers ofthese queries. 
Examples 4.8 and 4.9 show that this stage could prevent another new threat which 
can occur by hiding an unanswerable KRQ, which satisfies the FSCs, inside the p 
parts of the new user query. 
Example 4.8: 
Based on Table 3.3 and Table 3.4, assume that the following query has already been 
posed and stored in the AQ table: 
then, q11 = *3*.* = {5, 6, 10} , qld = 3 
sum(q1; Salary)= 600 
And, the new user query is posed as follows: 
qz = BSc + MSc 
then, q1z = **1.* + **2.* 
={6, 10}+{1,2,3,4,5, 7,8, 11}={1,2,3,4,5,6, 7,8, 10, 11}, lq1zl=l0 
sum(qz; Salary)= 1880 
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Then the snooper can pose the following query: 
q3 = MSc 
then,q13 =**2.* = {1,2,3,4,5, 7,8, II} 
sum(q3; Salary)= 1460 
The snooper applies the following formula to deduce Samy' s salary: 
Salary= sum(q1; Salary)- (sum(q2; Salary)- sum(q3; Salary)) 
= 600- (1880 -1460) = 180 • 
rff" This is Samy's Salary. 
By using the KRA, the query q12 = * * !. * + * *2. * should be prevented, since one of 
its parts q2_1 = **!.* satisfied thefirst stage conditions (FSCs) with the query q11 = 
*3*.* and q12,1n q1z,2= Ill. 
Example 4.9: 
Based on Table 3.6 and Table 3.7, assume that the following query has already been 
posed and stored in the AQ table: 
q1 =CS 
then, q11 =*!.*.*={I, 2, 8, 9, 10, II, 13} 
sum(q1; GP) = 20 
And, the new user query is posed as follows: 
qz =Math+ F.CS 
then, q12 = *2. *. * + 2"1. *. * 
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= {3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 14} +{I, 8, 9, 10, II, 13} 
={I, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, II, 12, 13, 14} 
sum(q2; GP) = 33 
Then the snooper can pose the following query: 
q3 =Math 
then, q13 = *2.* .* = {3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 14} 
sum(q3; GP) = 17 
The snooper applies the following formula to deduce Sara's GP: 
GP = sum(q1; GP)- (sum(q2; GP)- sum(q3; GP)) 
= 20- (33- 17) = 4 • 
(jj"' This is Sara's GP. 
By using the KRA, the query q12 = *2. *. * +21. *. * should be prevented, since one of its 
parts q2,1 = 21.*.* satisfied the first stage conditions (FSCs) with the query q11 = 
*I.*.* and q12,1 n q12,2 =<D. 
I { I I I } q h+l = q h+l,!o q h+\,2, ... 'q h+l,p 
Procedure Second_ Stage (q1h+IoP) 
Begin 
II The Second Stage: Case 1 
counter= 0; 
Prevent= False; 
F h I · I or eac q h+1,k m q h+1 
Begin 




Figure 4.3(a): The Second Stage Algorithm (SSA) 
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End; 
if (counter== 1) 
Prevent = True; 
end if; 
Inform the SDB to prevent q1h+I; 
return Prevent; 
II The Second Stage: Case 2 
counter= 0; 
Prevent = False; 
F h I · I or eac q h+I,k m q h+I 
Begin 
end; 
Intersection = False; 
if (First_Stage (q1h+I.k) ==True) 
end if; 









if (Intersection == False) 
counter++; 
endif; 




Inform the SDB to prevent q1h+I; 
return Prevent; 
Prevent= False; 
Inform the SDB to permit q1h+ 1; 
return Prevent; 
Figure 4.3(b): The Second Stage Algorithm (SSA) 
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4.2.3 The Third Audit Stage 
Since the SOB in this scheme is online and dynamic, the individuals' records of an 
SOB need to be inserted, deleted and updated dynamically. After updating the SOB, 
the snooper may repeat invoking one of the previous queries again. In this case the 
third audit stage can be used to decide whether the new user query is legal or not. The 
proposed Third Stage Algorithm (TSA) is shown in Figure 4.4(a) and Figure 4.4(b), 
while Figure 4.5 depicts the flow chart for the key representation auditing scheme 
(KRAS). 
Insertion and deletion attacks can be prevented by using the third audit stage; 
examples 4.10 and 4.11 below show how the proposed scheme could prevent this 
attack. Moreover, examples 4.12 and 4.13 show that this stage could prevent another 
new threat which can occur by hiding a repeated unanswerable KRQ, which does not 
satisfy TSC, inside the p parts of the new user query. 
For this stage we have the following two cases: 
4. 2. 3.1 The Third Audit Stage: Case 1 
If the new key representation query q1h+ 1 is equal to one of the prevwus key 
representation queries which has already been posed and stored in the AQ table, 
namely q1h+l = q\ (for some i € {I, 2, ... , h} ), then the KRA compares between the 
query-set size column and the latest query-set size column, namely lq1,1 and Llq\1, 
respectively. 
The Third Stage Condition (TSC): 
A new KRQ q1h+l is permitted if: 
, (for some i € {I, 2, ... , h}) 
where, n::>O is a parameter of a database. 
If the above condition is satisfied, then invoking the query q1h+ 1 again is permitted. 
Otherwise, the query q1h+ 1 is prevented. 
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Example 4.10: 
Based on Table 3.3 and Table 3.4, let us suppose that the user posed the query: 
q=PE 
then, q1 = *3*.* = {5, 6,10} , lq11 = 3, Llq11 = 3 
After inserting a new record (13, Farid, M, PE, MSc, 250), the Llq1l value will be 4. If 
the user posed the query q = PE again, 
Then, q1 = *3*.* = {5, 6,10, 13} , lq11 = 3, Llq11 = 4 
By using the KRA with n=2, the query q1 = *3*. * should be prevented, since 
ABS(Iq\1-Liq\1) = I doesn't satisfy the third stage condition (TSC). 
Example 4.11: 
Based on Table 3.6 and Table 3.7, let us suppose that the user posed the query: 
q =Math 
then, q1 = *2.*.* = {3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 14} , lq'1=7, Llq11=7 
After inserting a new record (15, Zainab, F, Math, 22, 3), the Llq11 value will be 8. If 
the user posed the query q = Math again, 
then, q1 = *2.*.* = {3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 14, 15} , lq11=7, Llq11=8 
By using the KRA with n=2, the query q1 = *2. *. * should be prevented, since 
ABS(Iq\1 - Llq\1) = I doesn't satisfy the third stage condition (TSC). 
4.2.3.2 The Third Audit Stage: Case 2 
If the new key representation query q1h+l consists of p parts, for some positive integer 
p: 
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I I I I q h+l = q h+l,l + q h+l,2 + ... + q h+l,p. 
and one of its parts, say q1h+t,k (for some k € { 1, 2, ... , p} ), is equal to one of the 
previous KRQs which has already been posed and stored in the AQ table, namely 
q1h+t,k= q\ (for some i € {I, 2, ... , h} ), and if: 
(!~~ andj fc k) 
then the KRA checks the third stage condition (ISC). If the condition is satisfied, then 
the new user query q1h+J is permitted, otherwise the query q1h+J is prevented. That is 
because if the KRA permitted this query and the snooper poses another query q1h+Z 
with the same parts of q1h+J excluding the kth part, then he can deduce the individual's 
information by subtracting the answers of these queries. 
Example 4.12: 
Based on Table 3.3 and Table 3.4, let us suppose that the user posed the query: 
then, q\ = *3*.* = {5, 6, 10} , I q\1=3, Ll q11l= 3 
sum(qt; Salary)= 600 
After inserting a new record (13, Farid, M, PE, MSc, 250), the Ll q1tl value will be 4. 
If the user posed the query: 
qz =PhD+ PE 
then, q1z = **3.* + *3*.* = {9, 12} + {5, 6, 10, 13} = {5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 13} 
sum(qz; Salary)= 910 
Then the snooper can pose the following query: 
q3 =PhD 
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then, q13 = **3.* = {9, 12} 
sum(q3; Salary)= 60 
The snooper applies the following formula to deduce Farid's salary: 
Salary= sum(qz; Salary)- sum(q3; Salary)- sum(qi; Salary) 
=910-60-600=250 • 
(ffr This is Farid' s Salary. 
By using the KRA with n = 2, the query q12 = **3. * + *3*. * should be prevented, 
since one of its parts q1z.z= *3*.* is equal to one of the previous KRQs and ABS(Iq\1-
Liq\1)=1 doesn't satisfy the third stage condition (TSC). 
Example 4.13: 
Based on Table 3.6 and Table 3.7, let us suppose that the user posed the query: 
then, q11 = *2.*.* = {3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 14} 
sum(qi; GP) = 17 
After inserting a new record (15, Salih, M, Math, 22, 3), the Ll q11l value will be 8. 
If the user posed the query: 
qz = F.CS +Math 
then, q12 = 21. *. * + *2. *. * = {I, 8, 9, I 0, II, 13} + {3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 14, 15} 
={I, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, II, 12, 13, 14, 15} 
sum(qz; GP) = 36 
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Then the snooper can pose the following query: 
q1 = F.CS 
then, q13 = 21.•.• = {1, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13} 
sum(q3; GP) = 16 
The snooper applies the following formula to deduce Salih's GP: 
=36-16-17=3 • 
(ff' This is Salih's GP. 
By using the KRA with n = 2, the query q12 = 21. *. * + *2. *. * should be prevented, 
since one of its parts q12.2 = *2. *. * is equal to one of the previous KRQs and ABS(Iq\I-
Liq\1)=1 doesn't satisfy the third stage condition (TSC). 
AQ = {q11, q12, ... , q1h} 
I { I I I } qh+I = qh+I,I, qh+J,2, ... , qh+l,p 
Procedure Third _Stage_Condition (q1m) 
Begin 





End· Pro~edure Third_Stage (q1h+I) 
Begin 
II The Third Stage: Case 1 
Permit= False; 
For each q\ in AQ 
Begin 
If (q1h+l == q\) 









Inform the SOB to permit q 1h+I; 
return Permit; 
Permit= False; 
Inform the SOB to prevent q1h+ 1; 
return Permit; 
II The Third Stage : Case 2 
counter= 0; 
Permit= False; 
F h I · I or eac qh+I,k m qh+I 
Begin 
end; 
Intersection = False; 
If (Third_Stage(q1h+I k) ==True) 
I ' I 
endif; 









if (Intersection== False) 
counter++; 
end if; 
If (counter>= I) 
Permit = True; 
else 
end if; 
Inform the SOB to permit q1h+I; 
return Permit; 
Permit= False; 
Inform the SOB to prevent q 1h+I; 
return Permit; 
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lnformSDBtoJ~---------------------------------------------" 
prevent q':r.+l 
~------------------------------------~--------------------~~. perrrutqTl _4-----------_J ~ I Inform_ SDB to I End 4 + 
4.3 Summary 
Three audit stages of our proposed scheme were provided in this chapter, these stages 
were proposed to protect online and dynamic SDBs from being disclosed. Efficient 
algorithms for these stages were presented. These algorithms enable the key 
representation auditor (KRA) to conveniently specify the illegal queries which could 
lead to disclosing the SDB. In addition, many examples for each stage were provided. 
These examples showed how the KRA could prevent the SDB threats such as 
individual trackers, general trackers, double trackers and insertion and deletion 
attacks. Also, the new scheme could prevent another three new types of threats which 
can occur by stitching two answerable queries using two different category attributes, 
hiding an unanswerable KRQ, which satisfies the FSCs, inside the p parts of the new 
user query and hiding a repeated unanswerable KRQ, which does not satisfy the TSC, 
inside the p parts of the new user query. 
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CHAPTERS 
COST ESTIMATION FOR THE KEY REPRESENTATION 
AUDITING SCHEME 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides cost estimation for our proposed scheme (KRAS), and this 
study illustrates the savings in block accesses (CPU time) and storage space that are 
attainable when a KRDB is used. Comparisons between the KRDB and the original 
database are provided in terms of number of blocks, linear search, binary search and 
sorting. The results of the comparisons showed that there is vast improvement in 
terms of number of blocks, linear search and sorting. And slight improvement in 
terms of binary search. The proposed scheme (KRAS) depends directly on the KRDB, 
which saves block accesses (CPU time) and storage space compared to the original 
database, while all the schemes proposed by previous works depend directly on the 
original database. 
5.2 Cost Estimation 
The records of a table must be allocated to disk blocks, because a block is the unit of 
data transfer between disk and memory [3]. The key representation database (KRDB) 
D 1 needs substantially fewer blocks than does the original database D. That is because 
each KRDB record is typically smaller in size than an original database record since it 
has only two attributes; consequently, more KRDB records than original database 
records can fit in one block. 
78 
5.3 Parameters of the Cost Estimation 
Suppose that the block size is B bytes. For the original database D of fixed-length 
records of size R bytes, with B?R, we can fit hfr = l Bl Rj records per block, where 
"l J" denotes flooring (round down to nearest integer). The value hfr is called the 
blocking factor for the table [3][2]. R can be computed as follows: 
t+d 
R = ~Size(Aj) 
j~l 
The number of blocks h needed for the original database of N records is h = 
IN 1 hfr l blocks, where" 11" denotes ceiling (round up to nearest integer). 
For the KRDB Di of fixed-length records of size Ri bytes, we can fit hfri = 




because for each KRDB record there are only t bytes for the t category attributes (A1, 
A2, ••. , A1), d bytes for the d data attributes' separators and d data attributes (At+ I, 
A1+2, •.. , At+ct). The number of blocks hi needed for the KRDB of N records is hi = 
IN I hfr'l blocks. 
Table 5.1 shows the parameters of the cost estimation for the original database D 
and the key representation database D\ 
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Record Size t+d t+d 
R= l:Size(Aj) R1= t+ d+ L:size(Aj) 
(bytes) i""l j==l+\ 
Blocking Factor 
bfr= lBIRj bfr1 = LBI R'j 
(Record/Block) 
Number of Blocks 
b =IN I bfr l b1 =IN I bfr'l 
(Blocks) 
5.4 Comparisons between the KRDB and the Original Database 
This section provides comparisons between the KRDB and the original database in 
terms of number of blocks, linear search, binary search and sorting. These 
comparisons are performed for the following two case studies. The results of the 
comparisons showed that there is vast improvement in terms of number of blocks, 
linear search and sorting. And slight improvement in terms of binary search [56][57]. 
In this section, the terms vast, slight and fair improvement can be used as follows: 
• Vast: if Reduction 2: 70%, 
• Slight: if Reduction<:; 40%, 
• Fair: otherwise. 
5.4.1 Case Study I- One Data Attribute 
Based on the first example which has been stated in section 3.3.5.1, consider the 
following two examples which compare the original database with its corresponding 
KRDB. These examples illustrate the savings in block accesses (CPU time) and 
storage space that are attainable when a KRDB is used (see Table 5.2). 
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Example 5.1: 
The fixed-length records of the original database in Table 3.3 have a record size of R 
= 4 + 20 + I + 2 + 3 + 4 = 34 bytes. Suppose that this table contains N = 30,000 
records on a disk with a block size of B = I 024 bytes. The blocking factor for the 
table would be hfr= LB I Rj = L!024/34j = 30 record/block. 
• The number of blocks needed for this table is h = IN I hfr l = 130,000/30 l = 
1000 blocks. 
• A linear search on this table would need h = I 000 block accesses. 
• To perform a binary search on this table, in case it is an ordered table, would 
need approximately I log, h l = llog, I 000 l = I 0 block accesses. 
• If a table has to be sorted, we would have to add the cost of the sort, which 
would need approximately I h iog2 h l = II OOO!og2 1000 l = 9966 block 
accesses. 
Example 5.2: 
Consider the KRDB Di in Table 3 .4, which its fixed-length records have a record size 
of Ri = 3 + I + 4 = 8 bytes. Suppose that this table also contains N = 30,000 records 
on a disk with a block size of B = I 024 bytes. The blocking factor for the table would 
be hfri = LB I R'j = Ll024/8j = 128 record/block. 
• The number of blocks needed for this table is hi = IN I hfr'l = l30,000/128l 
= 235 blocks. This is a vast improvement over the number of blocks needed 
for the original database D, which required 1000 blocks. 
• A linear search on this table would need hi= 235 block accesses. This is a vast 
improvement over the 1000 block accesses needed for a linear search on the 
original database D (see Figure 5.l(a)). 
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o A binary search on this table, would need approximately jlog2 b'l = 
jlog2 235l = 8 block accesses. This is a slight improvement over the I 0 block 
accesses needed for a binary search on tlle original database D (see Figure 
5.l(b)). 
o The cost for sorting this table would need approximately I b' log, b'l = 
j235log2 235l = 1851 block accesses. Tllis is a vast improvement over the 
9966 block accesses needed for sorting the original database D (see Figure 
5.l(c)). 
Table 5.2: Case Study I- The KRDB D 1 VS the Original Database D 
b = 1000 76.5% Vast 
76.5% Vast 
Slight 
jblog2 bl=9966 jb'log, b'l=I851 81.4% Vast 
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Figure 5.l(a): Case Study I- Linear Search: the Original Database Vs the KRDB 
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Figure 5.l(b): Case Study I- Binary Search: the Original Database Vs the KRDB 
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Figure 5.l(c): Case Study I- Sorting: the Original Database Vs the KRDB 
5.4.2 Case Study II- More than One Data Attributes 
Based on the second example which has been stated in section 3.3.5.2, consider the 
following two examples which compare the original database with its corresponding 
KRDB. These examples illustrate the savings m block accesses (CPU time) and 
storage space that are attainable when a KRDB is used (see Table 5.3). 
Example 5.3: 
The fixed-length records of the original database in Table 3.6 have a record size of R 
= 4 + 20 + 6 + 4 + 4 + 4 = 42 bytes. Suppose that this table contains N = 30,000 
records on a disk with a block size of B = 1024 bytes. The blocking factor for the 
table would be bfr = LB I Rj = Ll0241 42j = 24 record/block. 
• The number of blocks needed for this table is b = IN I bfr l = 130,000 I 24l = 
1250 blocks. 
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• A linear search on this table would need b = 1250 block accesses. 
• To perform a binary search on this table, in case it is an ordered table, would 
need approximately flog, b l = flog 2 1250 l =II block accesses. 
• If a table has to be sorted, we would have to add the cost of the sort, which 
would need approximately f b log, b l = f!250 log, 1250 l = 12860 block 
accesses. 
Example 5.4: 
Consider the KRDB D1 in Table 3.7, which its fixed-length records have a record size 
of R1 = 2 + 2 + 4 + 4 = 12 bytes. Suppose that this table also contains N = 30,000 
records on a disk with a block size of B = I 024 bytes. The blocking factor for the 
table would be bfr1 = LB I R'j = L1024112j = 85 record/block. 
• The number of blocks needed for this table is b1 = f N I bfr'l = f 30,000185l = 
353 blocks. This is a vast improvement over the number of blocks needed for 
the original database D, which required 1250 blocks. 
• A linear search on this table would need b1 = 353 block accesses. This is a vast 
improvement over the 1250 block accesses needed for a linear search on the 
original database D (see Figure 5.2(a)). 
• A binary search on this table, would need approximately flog, b'l = 
flog, 353l = 9 block accesses. This is a slight improvement over the II block 
accesses needed for a binary search on the original database D (see Figure 
5.2(b)). 
• The cost for sorting this table would need approximately f b'log2 b'l = 
f353log 2 353l = 2988 block accesses. This is a vast improvement over the 
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Table 5.3: Case Study II- The KRDB D1 VS the Original Database D 
b = 1250 b1 = 353 71.8% 
b = 1250 b1 = 353 71.8% 
flog, b l = 11 flog, b'l = 9 18.2% 
r b log, b l =12860 r b'log, b'l =2988 76.8% 
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Figure 5.2(c): Case Study II- Sorting: the Original Database Vs the KRDB 
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5.5 Summary 
In this chapter, cost estimation for our proposed scheme (KRAS) was performed, and 
it illustrated the savings in block accesses (CPU time) and storage space that are 
attainable when a KRDB is used. Comparisons were made between the KRDB and 
the original database in terms of number of blocks, linear search, binary search and 
sorting. These comparisons were performed for two case studies which have been 
presented in section 3.3.5. The results of the comparisons showed that there is vast 
improvement in terms of number of blocks, linear search and sorting. And slight 
improvement in terms of binary search. All the schemes proposed by previous works 
depend directly on the original database, while our proposed scheme (KRAS) depends 
directly on the KRDB, which saves block accesses (CPU time) and storage space 
compared to the original database. 
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CHAPTER6 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS FOR THE KEY REPRESENTATION 
DATABASE AND THE ORIGINAL DATABASE 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides statistical analysis and comparative study to compare between 
means and variances of the original database and the KRDB populations. 
Comparisons between the KRDB and the original database are provided in terms of 
record size, number of blocks, linear search, binary search and sorting to examine 
whether the KRDB is better than the original database or not. The statistical analysis 
uses t-test and F-test to evaluate the differences in means and variances, respectively, 
between the two populations. The size of the sample drawn from each population is 
25. The null hypothesis, that there will be no significant difference between the two 
populations' means/variances, against the alternative hypothesis, that there will be a 
significant difference between the two populations' means/variances are tested. The 
results of the tests showed that the differences between means/variances are 
statistically significant, except in one case, namely the difference between the 
variances in terms of binary search. 
6.2 Comparisons between the KRDB and the Original Database 
Statistical analysis and comparative study were provided to compare between means 
and variances of the original database and the KRDB populations. The comparisons 
were made in terms of record size, number of blocks, linear search, binary search and 
sorting to examine whether the KRDB is better than the original database or not. The 
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t-test and F-test were used to evaluate the differences m means and vanances, 
respectively, between the two populations [58]-[63]. 
6.2.1 Record Size: the Original Database Vs tho~ KRDB 
Table 6.1 shows record sizes of the original databases (Rs) in comparison to their 
KRDBs (R1s). The size of each sample is 25. Rand R1 can be computed as follows: 
where: 
l+d 
R = Lsize(A1) 
j=d 
t+d 
R 1 =t+d+ Lsize(A1) 
j=t+l 
t =the number of category attributes 
d =the number of data attributes 
A1 =the attribute number j in the original database 
Table 6.1: Record Size: R V s R1 
Original DB KRDB Record Size Trial Runs Record Size 
R 
Rl 
I 34 8 
2 42 12 
3 57 15 
4 66 13 
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Table 6.1 -Continued 
Original DB KRDB Record Size Trial Runs Record Size Rl 
R 
5 87 9 
6 59 7 
7 57 8 
8 69 12 
9 64 13 
10 56 16 
11 74 8 
12 77 9 
13 66 22 
14 63 II 
15 94 11 
16 96 10 
17 II 0 15 
18 104 15 
19 139 14 
20 115 15 
21 78 14 
22 75 14 
23 85 15 
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Table 6.1 -Continued 
Original DB KRDB Record Size 
Trial Runs Record Size 
R 
R' 
24 110 11 
25 100 15 




The first trial run in Table 6.1 shows: 
• The record size of the original database which has been stated in Table 3.3 (R = 
4 + 20 + 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 34 bytes). 
• The record size of the key representation database (KRDB) which has been 
stated in Table 3.4 (R1 = 3 + I+ 4 = 8 bytes). 
6. 2.1.1 Comparing the Means in terms of Record Size 
In order to compare the record size means of the two types of databases, namely the 
original database and the KRDB, hypothesis was tested. The null hypothesis Ho: >tt = 
>t2, says that there will be no significant difference between the two populations' 
means, and the alternative hypothesis H.: >tt t- >t2. says that there will be a significant 
difference between the two populations' means, with a significant level of a= 0.05. 
The pooled variance S! can be computed as follows: 
= 24*614.74+24*11.51 =313.13 
48 
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The standard error of the difference between means S x -x can be computed as 
' ' 
follows: 
= 313.13*(-1 +-1 ) = 5.005 
25 25 





The critical value t,, obtained from a table of t-values, corresponding to the 
significant level of a= 0.05 with df= n, + n, -2 = 48 degrees of freedom, is: 
@"'With a= 0.05, reject H0 if t, > t,. 
By comparing the calculated value t, = 13.31 with the tabled value t, =2.009, the 
null hypothesis Ho should be rejected, and it can be concluded that there is a 
statistically significant difference between the means of the KRDB and the original 
database. 
6.2.1.2 Comparing the Variances in terms of Record Size 
Furthermore, in order to compare record size variances between the original database 
and the KRDB, another hypothesis was tested. The null hypothesis H0: G; = G;, says 
that there will be no significant difference between the two populations' vanances, 
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and the alternative hypothesis Ha: cr; t cr;, says that there will be a significant 
difference between the two populations' variances, with a significant level of a = 
0.05. 
The calculated value F, can be computed as follows: 
F = st' 
, s' 
2 
= 614.74 = 53.41 
11.51 
The critical values F, and F, , obtained from a table ofF -values, corresponding to 
' ' 
the significant level of a= 0.05 with dft = n1-I ·~ 24 and df2 = n2-I = 24 degrees of 
freedom, are: 
I~~ 
F - F 2 - F 0·97' - 2 2693 t1 - (n1-l,n2 -1) - (24,24) - · 
F - F~ - F 0·025 - I = I 0 4407 t, - (n,-l,n,-1) - (24,24) - F0975 = ' 
(24,24) 2.2693 
C1r With a= 0.05, reject H0 if F, < F, or F, :e: F, 
' ' 
By comparing the calculated value F, •= 53.41 with the tabled values 
F, = 2.2693 and F, = 0.4407, the null hypothesis H0 should be rejected, it can be 
' ' 
concluded that there is a statistically significant difference between the variances of 
the KRDB and the original database. 
6.2.2 Number of Blocks: the Original Database Vs the KRDB 
Besides record size, number of blocks was also compared between the original 
database and the KRDB. Table 6.2 shows the result of the comparison. The size of 
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each sample is 25. h, which is the number of blocks of the original database, and hi, 
which is number of blocks of the corresponding KRDB, can be computed as follows: 
h = fN I hfr l 
where: 
hfr = lBI Rj, hfri = LB I R'j, 
t+d t+d 
R= LSize(Aj),Ri=t+d+ LSize(A) 
j=l 
B = the block size, 
N = the database size. 
t = the number of category attributes 
d = the number of data attributes 
Table 6.2: Number of Blocks: h Vs hi 
Original DB KRDB 
Trial Runs Number of Blocks Number of Blocks 
h hi 
I 1000 235 
2 1250 353 
3 1765 442 
4 2000 385 
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Table 6.2 - Continued 
Original DB KRDB 
Trial Runs Number of Blocks Number of Blocks 
b b\ 
5 2728 266 
6 1765 206 
7 1765 235 
8 2143 353 
9 1875 385 
10 1667 469 
11 2308 235 
12 2308 266 
13 2000 653 
14 1875 323 
15 3000 323 
16 3000 295 
17 3334 442 
18 3334 442 
19 4286 411 
20 3750 442 
21 2308 411 
22 2308 411 
23 2500 442 
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Table 6.2- Continued 
Original DB KRDB 
Trial Runs Number of Blocks Number of Blocks 
h h' 
24 3334 323 
25 3000 442 
X, 2,424.12 367.60 
s' I 632,509.28 10,099.00 
In the first trial run in Table 6.2, h = 1000 blocks and bi = 235 blocks, namely the 
number of blocks of the original database and the KRDB, respectively, can be 
computed as follows: 
Suppose that the database contains N = 30,000 records on a disk with a block size 
of B = I 024 bytes. From the first trial run in Table 6.1, R = 34 and Ri = 8. Then, hfr 
and hfri can be computed as follows: 
hfr = LB I Rj = LI024/34j = 30 record/block 
bfri = LB I R'j = L!024/8j = 128 record/block. 
Then, b and hi can be computed as follows: 
h = l N I hfr l = j30,000/30 l = 1000 blocks 
hi= l N I hfr'l = j30,0001128l = 235 blocks. 
6. 2. 2.1 Comparing the Means in terms of Number of Blocks 
Again, the number of blocks means of the two databases was compared. The null 
hypothesis H0: ~1 = ~2, says that there will be no significant difference between the 
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two populations' means, and the alternative hypothesis H,: J.!l # J.!z, says that there will 
be a significant difference between the two populations' means, with a significant 
level of a.= 0.05. 
The pooled variance S! can be computed as follows: 
S' = (n, -1)S,' + (n 2 -1)Si 
' (n, + n2 - 2) 
= 24*632,509.28+24*10,099.00 = 321304.14 
48 , 
The standard error of the difference between means S" -x can be computed as 
. ' ' 
follows: 
= 321,304.14*(-1 +-1 ) = 160.33 
25 25 
The calculated value t, can be computed as follows: 
= 2,424.12-367.60 = 12.77 
160.33 
The critical value t1 , obtained from a table: of t-values, corresponding to the 
significant level of a.= 0.05 with df= n1 + n2 - 2 = 48 degrees of freedom, is: 
Gr With a.= 0.05, reject Ho if t, > t1 • 
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By comparing the calculated value t,= 12.77 with the tabled valuet,=2.009, the 
null hypothesis Ho should be rejected, and it can be concluded that there is a 
statistically significant difference between the means of the KRDB and the original 
database. 
6.2.2.2 Comparing the Variances in terms ofNumber of Blocks 
Moreover, the null hypothesis H0: cr; = cri, that there will be no significant 
difference between the two populations' variances, and the alternative hypothesis 
H,: cr; i cr;, that there will be a significant difference between the two populations' 
variances, were tested with a significant level of a= 0.05. 
The calculated value F, can be computed as follows: 
s' F __ I 




The critical values F,, and F,, , obtained from a table ofF -values, corresponding to 
the significant level of a = 0.05 with df1 = n 1-l = 24 and df2 = n2-l = 24 degrees of 
freedom, are: 
F =F~ =F 0025 = I = I =0.4407 
r, (n,-l,n,-1) (24,24) F0975 2.2693 (24,24) 
r:tF With a= 0.05, reject H0 if F,. < F,, or F, :e: F,, 
By comparing the calculated value F, = 62.63 with the tabled values 
F,, = 2.2693 and F,, = 0.4407, the null hypothesis H0 should be rejected, and it can 
99 
be concluded that there is a statistically significant difference between the variances 
of the KRDB and the original database. 
6.2.3 Linear Search: the Original Database Vs the KRDB 
As shown in Table 6.3, the results of comparisons between a linear search on the 
original databases and its corresponding KRDBs are presented. The size of each 
sample is 25. The linear search needs as follows: 
• On the original database b block acc(:sses . 
• On the KRDB b1 block accesses . 
Table 6.3: Linear Search: Original DB Vs KRDB 
Trial Runs Original DB KRDB Linear Search Linear Search 
I 1000 235 
2 1250 353 
3 1765 442 
4 2000 385 
5 2728 266 
6 1765 206 
7 1765 235 
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Table 6.3 - Continued 
Trial Runs Original DB KRDB Linear Search Linear Search 
8 2143 353 
9 1875 385 
10 1667 469 
II 2308 235 
12 2308 266 
13 2000 653 
14 1875 323 
IS 3000 323 
16 3000 295 
17 3334 442 
18 3334 442 
19 4286 411 
20 3750 442 
21 2308 411 
22 2308 411 
23 2500 442 
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Table 6.3 -Continued 
Trial Runs Original DB KRDB Linear Search Linear Search 
24 3334 323 
25 3000 442 
-




In the first trial run in Table 6.3: 
• The linear search of the original database would need b block accesses. From the 
first trial run in Table 6.2: b = 1000. 
• The linear search of the KRDB would need b1 block accesses. From the first trial 
run in Table 6.2: b1 = 235. 
6.2.3.1 Comparing the Means in terms of Linear Search 
The null hypothesis Ho: Ill= Jlz. that there will be no significant difference between 
the two populations' means, and the alternative hypothesis H.: Jl1 # Jlz, that there will 
be a significant difference between the two populations' means, were then tested with 
a significant level of a.= 0.05. 
The pooled variance S~ can be computed as follows: 
S' = (n1 -1)S12 + (n 2 -1)Si 
P (n 1 + n2 - 2) 
= 24 * 632,509.28 + 24 * 10,099.00 = 321,304.14 
48 
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The standard error of the difference between means S x _ x can be computed as 
' l 
follows: 
= 321,304.14*(-1 +-1 ) =160.33 
25 25 
The calculated value t, can be computed as follows: 
x,-x, 
t = ---'---'-
' S X -X-
' ' 
= 2,424.12-367.60 = 12.77 
160.33 
The critical value 11 , obtained from a table of t-values, corresponding to the 
significant level of a= 0.05 with df= n1 + n2 - 2 = 48 degrees of freedom, is: 
r::tr With a= 0.05, reject H0 if t, > t,. 
By comparing the calculated value t, = 12.77 with the tabled valuer, =2.009, the 
null hypothesis H0 should be rejected, and it can be concluded that there is a 
statistically significant difference between the means of the KRDB and the original 
database. 
6.2.3.2 Comparing the Variances in terms of Linear Search 
Another hypothesis was then tested for comparing the variances, in terms of linear 
search that needs to be performed in order to find relevant records from the original 
database and the KRDB. The null hypothesis H11 : ai = a;, says that there will be no 
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significant difference between the two populations' vanances, and the alternative 
hypothesis H.: cri # cr;, says that there will be a significant difference between the 
two populations' variances, with a significant level of a= 0.05. 
The calculated value F, can be computed as follows: 
F = s,2 
, s2 
2 
= 632,509.28 62.63 
10,099.00 
The critical values F, and F, , obtained from a table ofF -values, corresponding to 
' ' 
the significant level of a= 0.05 with dft = nt-1 = 24 and df2 = n2-l = 24 degrees of 
freedom, are: 
1-~ 
F - F 2 - F 0·''' - 2 2693 t - (n -In -I) - (24 24) - • I I ' 2 ' 
" F -F2 -F 0025 - I = I =0.4407 
t, - (n,-l,n,-1) - (24,24) - Fo 975 2.2693 (24,24) 
rir With a= 0.05, reject Ho if F, < F,, or F, ;>: F,, 
By comparing the calculated value F, •= 62.63 with the tabled values 
F, = 2.2693 and F, = 0.4407, the null hypothesis Ho should be rejected, and it can 
' ' 
be concluded that there is a statistically significant difference between the variances 
of the KRDB and the original database. 
6.2.4 Binary Search: the Original Database Vs the KRDB 
As shown in Table 6.4, the results of performing binary search on the original 
databases and its corresponding KRDBs are presented. The size of each sample is 25. 
The binary search needs as follows: 
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• On the original database, approximately, I log, b l block accesses. 
• On the KRDB, approximately, !Jog, b'l block accesses. 
Table 6.4: Binary Search: Original DB Vs KRDB 
Trial Runs Original DB KRDB Binary Search Binary Search 
I 10 8 
2 II 9 
3 II 9 
4 II 9 
5 12 9 
6 II 8 
7 II 8 
8 12 8 
9 II 9 
10 II 9 
II 12 8 
12 12 9 
13 11 10 
14 I 1 9 
15 12 9 
16 12 9 
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Table 6.4- Continued 
Original DB KRDB Trial Runs Binary Search Binary Search 
17 12 9 
18 12 9 
19 13 9 
20 12 9 
21 12 9 
22 12 9 
23 12 9 
24 12 9 
25 12 9 




In the first trial run in Table 6.4: 
• The binary search of the original database would need flog 2 b l = flog, 1000 l = 
10 block accesses. From the first trial run in Table 6.2: b = 1000. 
• The binary search of the KRDB would ne(:d flog, b'l = flog, 2351 = 8 block 
accesses. From the first trial run in Table 6.2: b1 = 235. 
6.2.4.1 Comparing the Means in terms of Binary Search 
The null hypothesis Ho: J.lt = J.lz, that there will be no significant difference between 
the two populations' means, and the alternative hypothesis H,: J.lt t J.lz, that there will 
106 
be a significant difference between the two populations' means, were tested with a 
significant level of a= 0.05. 
The pooled variance s; can be computed as follows: 
S' = (n1 -l)S12 + (n, -l)S~ 
P (n1 + n2 - 2) 
= 24 * 0.42 + 24 * 0.19 = 0.31 
48 
The standard error of the difference between means S x _, 1s computed can be 
' . ' 
follows: 
= 0.31 ·(-1 +-1 ) = 0.157 25 25 
The calculated value t, can be computed as follows: 
= 11.60-8.88 17.32 
0.157 
The critical value t,, obtained from a table of !-values, corresponding to the 
significant level of a= 0.05 with df= n1 + n2 - 2 = 48 degrees of freedom, is: 
r:ir With a= 0.05, reject H0 if t, > t,. 
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By comparing the calculated value ( = 17.32 with the tabled value t, =2.009, the 
null hypothesis Ho should be rejected, and it can be concluded that there is a 
statistically significant difference between the means of the KRDB and the original 
database. 
6.2.4.2 Comparing the Variances in terms of Binary Search 
The null hypothesis Ho: cri = cr;, that there will be no significant difference between 
the two populations' variances, against the alternative hypothesis H.: cri # cr;, that 
there will be a significant difference between the two populations' vanances, were 
tested with a significant level of a= 0.05. 
The calculated value F, can be computed as follows: 
F = sl' 
, s' 
2 
= 0.42 = 2.2105 
0.19 
The critical values F, and F, , obtained from a table ofF-values, corresponding to 
' ' 
the significant level of a= 0.05 with df1 = n1-l = 24 and df2 = n2-l = 24 degrees of 
freedom, are: 
1-~ 
F - F 2 - Fo·''s - 2 2693 t - (n -In -1) - (24 24) - · 1 I '2 ' 
- F ~ -Fools - I . = I = 0.4407 F,, - (n,-l,n,-1) - (24.24) - £0.975 2.2693 (24.241 
rJr With a= 0.05, reiect H0 if F. < F, or F. <: F, ~ C 2 C 1 
By comparing the calculated value F, =' 2.2105 with the tabled values 
F, = 2.2693 and F, = 0.4407, the null hypothesis H0 should be accepted, and it can 
' ' 
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be concluded that there is no a statistically significant difference between the 
variances of the KRDB and the original database. 
6.2.5 Sorting: the Original Database Vs the KRDB 
As shown in Table 6.5, the results of sorting original databases and its corresponding 
KRDBs are presented. The size of each sample is 25. Sorting needs as follows: 
• For the original database, approximately, I b log 2 b l block accesses. 
• For the KRDB, approximately, I b' log, b'l block accesses. 
Table 6.5: Sorting: Original DB Vs KRDB 
Trial Runs Sorting Original Sorting KRDB DB 
I 9,966 I ,851 
2 12,860 2,988 
3 19,037 3,885 
4 21,932 3,307 
5 31,137 2,143 
6 19,037 1,584 
7 19,037 1,851 
8 23,714 1,851 
9 20,387 3,307 
10 17,842 4,162 
11 25,786 1,851 
12 25,786 2,143 
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Table 6.5 -Continued 
Trial Runs Sorting Original Sorting KRDB DB 
13 21,932 6,107 
14 20,387 2,693 
15 34,653 2,693 
16 34,653 2,421 
17 39,018 3,885 
18 39,018 3,885 
19 51,713 3,569 
20 44,523 3,885 
21 25,786 3,569 
22 25,786 3,569 
23 28,220 3,885 
24 39,018 2,693 
25 34,653 3,885 
X; 27,435.24 3,151.96 
s' i 102,515,708.86 [ 1,014,098.37 
In the first trial run in Table 6.5: 
• Sorting the original database would need ['b log, b l = 11000 log, 1000 l = 9966 
block accesses. From the first trial run in Table 6.2: b = I 000. 
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• Sorting the KRDB would need I b'log2 b'l = I 235log2 235l = 1851 block 
accesses. From the first trial run in Table 6.2: b1 = 235. 
6.2.5.1 Comparing the Means in terms of Sorting 
The null hypothesis Ho: f.ll = f.l2, that there will be no significant difference between 
the two populations' means, and the alternative hypothesis H,: ~1 1 j f.l2, that there will 
be a significant difference between the two populations' means, were tested with a 
significant level of a= 0.05. 
The pooled variance S~ can be computed as follows: 
S' = (n, -l)S12 + (n, -l)Si 
P (n, + n2 - 2) 
= 24*102,515,708.86+24*1,014,098.37 = 51764903.615 
48 ' ' 
The standard error of the difference between means S'i,-x, can be computed as 
follows: 
= 51,764,903.615*(-1 +-1 ) = 2,034.99 
25 25 
The calculated value t, an be computed as follows: 
Ill 
= 27,435.24-3,151.96 = 11.93 
2,034.99 
The critical value t,, obtained from a table of t-values, corresponding to the 
significant level of a= 0.05 with df = n1 + n2 - 2 = 48 degrees of freedom, is: 
CJfF With a= 0.05, reject H0 if t, > t,. 
By comparing the calculated value t, = 11.93 with the tabled value t, =2.009, the 
null hypothesis Ho should be rejected, and it can be concluded that there is a 
statistically significant difference between the means of the KRDB and the original 
database. 
6.2.5.2 Comparing the Variances in terms of Sorting 
The null hypothesis H0: cri = cr;, that there will be no significant difference between 
the two populations' variances, against the alternative hypothesis H,: cr; 'fc cr;, that 
there will be a significant difference between the two populations' variances, were 
tested with a significant level of a= 0.05. 
The calculated value F, can be computed as follows: 
s' F __ I 
' - 2 s, 
= 102,515,708.86 = 101.09 
1,014,098.3 7 
The critical values F, and F, , obtained from a table ofF -values, corresponding to 
' ' 





Gr With a= 0.05, reJ· ect Ho if F < F, or F. 2: F, 
C 2 ' I 
By comparing the calculated value F, = I 01.09 with the tabled values 
F, = 2.2693 and F, = 0.4407, the null hypothesis Ho should be rejected, and it can 
' ' 
be concluded conclude that there is a statistically significant difference between the 
variances of the KRDB and the original database. 
6.3 Summary 
In this chapter, a statistical analysis was performed to compare between means and 
variances of the original database and the KRDB populations. Comparisons were 
made between the KRDB and the original database in terms of record size, number of 
blocks, linear search, binary search and sorting to examine whether the KRDB is 
better than the original database or not. This analysis used t-test and F -test to evaluate 
the differences in means and variances, respectively, between the two populations. 
The sample size for each population was 25. The null hypothesis, that there will be no 
significant difference between the two populations' means/variances, against the 
alternative hypothesis, that there will be a significant difference between the two 
populations' means/variances were tested. The results of the tests showed that the 
differences between means/variances are statistically significant, except in one case, 
namely the difference between the variances in terms of binary search. Table 6.6 
summarizes the statistical analysis results. 
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Means Ho Rejected Significant difference 
1 Record Size 
Variances Ho Rejected Significant difference 
Means Ho Rejected Significant difference 
2 Number of Blocks 
Variances Ho Rejected Significant difference 
Means Ho Rej•:cted Significant difference 
3 Linear Search 
Variances Ho Rej,:cted Significant difference 
Means Ho Rej,:cted Significant difference 
4 Binary Search 
Variances HoAccepted No significant difference 
Means Ho Rejected Significant difference 
5 Sorting 
Variances HoRejected Significant difference 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
7.1 Research Summary 
This research mainly introduces a new scheme for auditing online and dynamic SDBs 
to guarantee the security of online and dynamic SDBs, and to repel the attacks of 
snoopers (malicious users) to the confidentiality of the individuals. In addition, it is 
introduced to conveniently specify the illegal queries which could lead to disclosing 
the SDB. Since some of the major drawbacks of an auditing strategy is its excessive 
CPU time and storage requirements to process the retrieval of relevant records from 
the SDB, the main purpose of introducing this scheme is to reduce CPU time and 
storage space during query processing. 
The proposed scheme is called the key representation auditing scheme (KRAS). 
The core idea of this scheme is to convert the original database, which is in both 
string and numerical representations, into a key representation database (KRDB). 
Also, this scheme involves converting each new user query from string representation 
into a key representation query (KRQ) and storing it in the Audit Query table (AQ 
table). Hence, the first objective which is to develop a new scheme for auditing online 
and dynamic SDBs has been achieved. 
Three audit stages are also proposed in order to protect the confidentiality of the 
individuals. The three audit stages could prevent the SDB threats such as individual 
trackers, general trackers, double trackers, insertion and deletion attacks and all the 
other types of threats which can occur by stitching the answerable queries. 
Also, efficient algorithms for these stages are presented, namely the First Stage 
Algorithm (FSA), the Second Stage Algorithm (SSA) and the Third Stage Algorithm 
115 
(TSA). These algorithms enable the Key Representation Auditor (KRA) to 
conveniently specify the illegal queries which could lead to disclose the SDB. Hence, 
the second objective which is to guarantee the security of online and dynamic SDBs 
has been achieved. 
Since the new scheme does not resort to estimate the value of the new query 
response according to the distribution of the previous answered queries, the third 
objective which is to provide precise and accurate responses has been achieved. 
Cost estimation for the proposed scheme is pe:rformed. It is illustrated that there is 
savings in block accesses (CPU time) and storage space are attainable when a KRDB 
is used. Cost estimation comparisons between the KRDB and the original database in 
terms of number of blocks, linear search, binary search and sorting were also 
provided. The results of the comparisons show that there is a vast improvement in 
terms of the number of blocks, linear search and sorting. And there is a slight 
improvement in terms of the binary search. All the schemes proposed by previous 
works depend directly on the original database, while the proposed scheme (KRAS) 
depends directly on the KRDB, which saves block accesses (CPU time) and storage 
space compared to the original database. 
In addition, a statistical analysis and a comparative study to compare between the 
means and variances of the original database and the KRDB populations is also 
presented. The statistical analysis tests were made in terms of record size, number of 
blocks, linear search, binary search and sorting to examine whether the KRDB is 
better than the original database or not. T -test and F -test were used to evaluate the 
differences in means and variances, respectively, between the two populations. The 
null hypothesis, that there will be no significant difference between the two 
populations' means/variances, against the alternative hypothesis, that there will be a 
significant difference between the two populations' means/variances was tested. The 
results of the tests show that the differences, between means/variances, are 
statistically significant. Hence, the fourth objective which is to reduce CPU time and 
storage space during query processing has been also achieved. 
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Finally, the implementation of the new scheme was performed, and the 
components of the proposed system were discussed. In addition, the graphical user 
interface and its logical interaction were also developed. Moreover, by applying the 
three audit stages, the proposed system is capable of conveniently specifying whether 
the user query is answerable or not. 
7.2 Research Contributions 
This section presents the contributions of this study which is discussed in the earlier 
chapters of this thesis: 
• The new scheme guarantees the security of online and dynamic SOBs. The three 
audit stages could prevent the SOB threats such as individual trackers, general 
trackers, double trackers and insertion and deletion attacks. Moreover, it could 
prevent another new three types of threats which can occur by stitching two 
answerable queries using two different category attributes, hiding an unanswerable 
key representation query (KRQ), which satisfies the first stage conditions (FSCs) 
with one of the previous KRQs, inside the parts of the user query, and hiding a 
repeated unanswerable KRQ, which does not satisfy the third stage condition (TSC), 
inside the parts of the new user query. 
• The new scheme provides precise and accurate responses, while most of the 
previous works resort to estimate the value of the new response according to the 
distribution of the previous answered queries. 
• The new scheme, which depends directly on the key representation database 
(KROB), saves CPU time and storage space compared to the original database. All 
schemes proposed by previous works depend directly on the original database. 
117 
7.3 Future Directions 
Since the proposed scheme, namely the key representation auditing scheme (KRAS), 
includes only auditing count and sum statistilcal queries, for future work, the 
followings can be enhanced: 
• Online and dynamic auditing of other statistical quenes, including 
auditing of average, min, max and median queries. 
• Auditing of combinations of these queries. 
• Optimization of the algorithms. 
7.4 Research Conclusions 
In conclusion, the outcome of this research has provided an enhanced approach for 
efficient block accesses and space reduction audit scheme for statistical databases. It 
has fulfilled the research objectives which are to develop a new audit scheme for 
auditing online and dynamic SOBs, to guarantee: the security of online and dynamic 
SOBs by preventing illegal queries which could lead to disclosing the SOB, to 
provide precise and accurate responses and to reduce CPU time and storage space 
during query processing. 
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APPENDIX A 
SUBTRACTING P CELLS 
A.1 Consider Example 4.1 in Section 4.2.1 
• Here the first cell and the fourth cell should be excluded, because these 
cells are the common cells between q11 and q12. So, the first and the 
fourth cells in q1, should be 2 and*, respectively. 
• The second cell (Dept= {1, 2, 3}) (refer to Table 3.4): 
q\. I· * implies { 1, 2, 3} 
q12: 1 implies {2, 3} 
Then,*-1 ={1,2,3}-{2,3}={1}=1 
• The third cell (Level= { 1, 2, 3} ): 
q1,: * implies {1, 2, 3} 
q12: 2 implies {I, 3} 
Then, * - 2 = { 1, 2, 3} - { 1, 3} = { 2} = 2 
• Accordingly, q\ = q11 - q12 = 2**.*- 212.* = 212.* = {4} 
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• The answer of the result query q1,, referring to Table 3.3 and Table 3.4, is 
the fourth record. That means the fourth record, namely Sari a's record, 
can be disclosed if the query q12 is permitted. 
A.2 Consider Example 4.2 in Section 4.2.1 
ql _ql ql -*3* * **I* r- 1~ 2- •- • 
• Here the first and the fourth cells should be excluded. So, the first and the 
fourth cells in q1, should be * and *. 
• The second cell (Dept= {I, 2, 3}) (refer to Table 3.4): 
q12: * implies {I, 2, 3} 
Then, 3 - * = { 3} - { I, 2, 3} = <D 
WIn this case assume without loss of generality that 
lfXbj- Xaj = <D, then let Xrj = Xbj· 
Consequently, 3- * = {3}- {I, 2, 3} = {3} = 3 
• The third cell (Level= {I, 2, 3} ): 
ql. J. 
ql. 2· 
* implies {I, 2, 3} 
I implies {I} 
Then, * - I = { I, 2, 3} - { I } = { 2, 3} = I 
• Accordingly, q1, = q11 - q12 = *3*.*- **I.*= *31.* = {5} 
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• The answer of the result query q\, referring to Table 3.3 and Table 3 .4, is 
the fifth record. That means the fifth record, namely Samy's record, can 
be disclosed if the query q12 is permitted. 
A.3 Consider Example 4.3 in Section 4.2.1 
• Here the fourth cell should be excluded. So, the fourth cell in q1, should 
be*. 
• The first cell (Gender= {I, 2}) (refer to Table 4.4): 
q\. l· 
I . qz. 
I implies {I} 
* implies{1,2} 
Then, I - * = { I } - { I, 2} = <D 
r:iF In this case assume, as mentioned earlier, without loss of 
generality that 
Consequently, I-* = {1}- {1, 2} = {1} = 1 
• The second cell (Dept = { 1, 2, 3} ): 
q\. l· 1 implies { 1} 
* implies {I, 2, 3} 
Then, 1 - * = { 1} - { 1, 2, 3} = <!> 
r:iF In this case assume, as mentioned earlier, without loss of 
generality that 
130 
If Xbj - Xaj = <D, then let Xrj = Xbj. 
Consequently, 1- * = {1}- {1, 2, 3} = {1} = 1 
• The third cell (Level = { 1, 2, 3} ): 
q\. l· * implies { 1, 2, 3} 
q\. 2· implies { 1} 
Then,*-1={1,2,3}-{1}={2,3}= 1 
• Accordingly,q\=q11-q12 =11*.*-**1.*= 11l.* ={1,7,12} 
• The answer of the result query q1,, referring to Table 3.3 and Table 3.4, is 
the first, seventh and 12'11 records. That means permitting the query q12 
would not disclose the SDB. 
A.4 Consider Example 4.4 in Section 4.2.1 
q\ = q1 - q1 = * 1 * * - 2-1 * * r 1 2 • • • • 
• Here the second, the third and the fourth cells should be excluded. So, the 
second, the third and the fourth cells in q\ should be 1, * and *, 
respectively. 
• The first cell (Gender= {1, 2}) (refer to Table 3.7): 
q\. I· 
I . qz. 
* implies {I, 2} 
2 implies { 1} 
-
Then, * - 2 = { 1, 2} - { 1 } = { 2} = 2 
• Accordingly,q1,=q11 -q12 =*1.*.*- 21.*.*=21.*.*={2} 
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• The answer of the result query q1,, referring to Table 3.6 and Table 3.7, is 
the second record. That means the second record, namely Sara's record, 
can be disclosed if the query q12 is permitted. 
A.S Consider Example 4.5 in Section 4.2.1 
• Here the first, the third and the fourth cells should be excluded. So, the 
first, the third and the fourth cells in q1, should be *, 21 and * 
respectively. 
• The second cell (Dept = { 1, 2}) (refer to Table 3. 7): 
q11: * implies {1, 2} 
Then,* -2= {1,2}- {2} = {1} = 2 
• Accordingly,q1,=q11-q12 =**.21.*-*2.21.*= *2.21.*={8} 
• The answer of the result query q1,, referring to Table 3.6 and Table 3.7, is 
the g'h record. That means the gth record, namely Nasir's record, can be 
disclosed ifthe query q12 is permitted. 
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APPENDIXB 
DEVELOPMENT OF KEY REPRESENTATION AUDITING SOFTWARE 
B.l The Proposed Key Representation Auditing Software 
The proposed system can be set as a core of auditing online and dynamic SDBs, and it 
will play a vital role to guarantee the security of SDBs among the three audit stages 
which discussed previously in chapter four. 
The database of the proposed system contains various tables with relationships 
among them. It stores all the required data such as the original data about the 
individuals, the key representation data and the answered key representation queries. 
It does provide the system with all the needed data in order to obtain the final decision 
and to specify the illegal queries which could lead to disclosing the SDB. 
Basically the inputs for this system can be identified in two major groups. Firstly, 
the original information about individuals, including category and data attributes, such 
as name, gender, department, salary, etc. Secondly, the user query which may consists 
of one part or more than one part. The system converts the original data and the user 
query into key representation data and key representation query, respectively. When a 
user submits a query to the system, the three audit stages will be applied to decide 
whether the query is answerable or not. 
Considering the first example which was stated earlier in section 3.3.5.1, the next 
section gives a glimpse of the input screens of the proposed system as well as the 
system output. 
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8.2 The Graphical User Interface 
From the main screen, the SDB user has three different options available. The first 
option is storing the basic information of employees using the Employee Data button. 
The second option is allowing the user to enter his query using the User Query button. 
The final option is closing the system using the Exit button. Figure B. l depicts the 
main screen of the system. 
The Main Menu 
KRAS for Securing Statistical Database 




Figure B.l: The Main Screen 
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B.2.1 Employee Data Screen 
From the main screen, when the Employee Data button has been pressed, the 
employee data screen will immediately appear, as shown below in Figure B.2, which 
contains fields for entering the employee data. The SDB user can add more employees 
or manipulate the data using the buttons Add, Save, Cancel, Search, Edit and Delete. 
Whereas, the buttons Employee Data and KRDB Data are only allowable for the SDB 
administrator to show him the original data (see Figure B.3) and the key 
representation data (see Figure B.4), respectively. 
Employee Data 
Employee Name: IAdil 
Gender: I Male ~ 
OeJ>artment: 1 cs ~ 
Level: I MSc ~ 
Salary: J200 
8dd ~dve Cancel 
Searc!1 fdit D.elete Close 
Employee Data KRDB Data 
Figure B.2: Employee Data Screen 
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Browse KRDB Data 














Figure B.4: Browse KRDB Data Screen 
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B.2.2 User Query Screen 
From the main screen, when the User Query button has been pressed, the user query 
screen will immediately appear, as shown below in Figure B.S. This screen contains 
all the category and data attributes, and it allows the user to determine all the 
conditions of his query. Also, it allows the user to add new parts for the query using 
the OR button or remove some parts from the query using the X button. For each 
category attribute, there are two types of Not Sign (NS). The first type is the green not 
sign (green NS), namely the not sign for the specific category attribute. The 
corresponding values of the green NS are either 0 if it is not checked or 1 if it is 
checked by the user. The second type is the red not sign (red NS), namely the not sign 
for at least two category attributes. The corresponding values of the red NS are either 
0 if it is not checked or 2 if it is checked by the user. 
User Query 
Gender Dept Level Salary 
r Not I r Not Male _:j r Not i PE r Not _:j r Not i• r Not _:j n ___2j 
r Not , . 
_:j P" Not _:j r Not I* _:j [i.i3 1100 1500 OR I ~ r Not r Not I cs r Not 
New Query Ill Query Result ]~ • _ .. H-~ - ........ ... ~- ". 
Browse Result I Browse AQ table 1 
Exit 
Figure B.5: User Query Screen 
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By hitting the Query Result button, the system will apply the three audit stages to 
decide whether the query could lead to disclosing the SDB or not. If the current user 
query is answerable, namely it could not lead to disclosing the SDB, the result of the 
query will immediately appear (see Figure B.6). But if the current user query is not 
answerable, namely it could lead to disclosing the SOB, a message will appear to 
show the user that this query is prevented (see Figure B.7). 
~· 
User 9.~!Y,.,..>~.. _... . . , • ' N "• • • -- ·'"' ~- .. -.... • .. ·- .... .,. .,., • -- • .--· • ·c •.• , .•• , . c 
Gender Dept Level Salary 
r Not r Not r Not 1• 
.:J OR ] r Not I Male .:J r NotiPE .:J r Not n 
r Not ]• Ji7 Not 3 r Not I• 3 fiJ3]100 jsoo OR ' ~ r Not 3 r NotiCS r Not 
Query Result ~~ 
~ i" ) "'\? The query total Sun- 1330 
OK 
II Query Result I ~ 
--~~~~~~~~~~~~:~'----------', Exit Browse Result . Browse AQ table .
New Query 
Figure B.6: Permitted Query Result 
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2.J 
Gender Dept level Salary 
r Not · -
r Not I Female .:J r Not r Not I CS .:J r Not r Not I MSc .:J n 
r Not· - r Not 1· r Not I• r Not I Female .:J ::J ::J 1>- ::J 1100 r Not r Not 
Check the query rgj 
0 Tlls query is PREVENTED. 
___ N_e_w_Q_ue_ry __ __.ll Query Result 
__ s_ro_w_s_e _Re_s_ut_t _ _.I Browse AQ table 
I ~-·· I j___:__J 




The buttons Browse Result and Browse AQ Table are only allowable for the SDB 
administrator, to show him the result of the current query (see Figure B.8) and the 
answered key representation queries (see Figure B.9), respectively. 







Figure B.8: Browse Query Result Screen 
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Browse AQ Table 
KRQ 








Figure B.9: Browse AQ Table Screen 
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APPENDIXC 
THE PROGRAM CODE 
C. I Main Form 
Private Sub cmdEmployeeData _Click() 
frmEmployeeForm.Show 
End Sub 
Private Sub cmdExit_ Click() 
End 
End Sub 
Private Sub cmdUserQuery _Click() 
frm U serQuery. Show 
End Sub 
C.2 Employee Data Form 
Dim Found As Boolean 
Dim Answer As String 
Dim CurrentRecNo As Integer 
Private Sub Form Load() 
Me.cmdSave.Enabled = False 
Me.cmdCancel.Enabled =False 
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Me.cmdEdit.Enabled = False 
Me.cmdDelete.Enabled = False 
Me.cmdAdd.Enabled = True 
Me.cmdClose.Enabled =True 
Me.cmdSearch.Enabled = True 
Me.txtName.Text = '"' 
EraseTextBoxes 
End Sub 
Private Sub cmdAdd Click() 
Me.cmdSave.Enabled = True 
Me.cmdCancel.Enabled = True 
Me.cmdEdit.Enabled =False 
Me.cmdDelete.Enabled =False 
Me.cmdAdd.Enabled = False 
Me.cmdClose.Enabled = False 
Me.cmdSearch.Enabled =False 




Private Sub cmdBrowseEmployee Click() 














frmBrowseEmployees.lstDept.Additem .Fields! Dept 
frmBrowseEmployees.lstLevel.Additem .Fields! I ,eve! 







If Err = 3021 Then 




Private Sub cmdBrowseKRDB _Click() 






Do While Not .EOF 
frmBrowseKRDB.lstRecNo.Additem .Fields!recNo 
frmBrowseKRDB.lstCategoryKeys.Addltem .Fields!caO & .Fields!cal & 






If Err= 3021 Then 
MsgBox "Sorry Key Representation Database Table 1s empty now.", 
vbinformation, "KRDB Table" 
End If 
End Sub 
Private Sub cmdBrwoseAQtbl Click() 
On Error Go To Err Handler 
With Me.datAQtbl.Recordset 
.MoveFirst 
Do While Not .EOF 
frmBrowse_AQ_tbl.lstKRQ.Additem .Fields!caO & .Fields!cal & .Fields!ca2 
&H." 
& .Fields!Op & "." & .Fields!Vl & "." & .Fields!V2 
frmBrowse_AQ_tbl.lstNS.Addltem .Fields!NSO & .Fields!NSI & .Fields!NS2 
frmBrowse _ AQ_tbl.lst_ q__set_size.Addltem .Fields !q__set_size 
146 




frmBrowse AQ tbl.Show 
Exit Sub 
Err Handler: 
If Err= 3021 Then 
MsgBox "Sorry Audit Query Table is empty now.", vbinformation, "AQ Table" 
End If 
End Sub 
Private Sub cmdCancel_ Click() 
Me.txtName.Text = "" 
EraseTextBoxes 
MsgBox "Insertion, modification or deletion IS cancelled.", vbinformation, 
"Cancelling" 
Me.cmdSave.Enabled =False 












Private Sub cmdDelete _Click() 
Dim myCriteria As String 
Dim kr As KRDB rec 
myCriteria = "recNo=" & CurrentRecNo 
If Found= True Then 
Answer = MsgBox("Are you sure?", vbYesNo + vbDefaultButton2 + 
vbQuestion, "Deletion") 




If Not .NoMatch Then 
kr.ca(O) = .Fields!caO 
kr.ca(l) = .Fields!cal 
kr.ca(2) = .Fields!ca2 








MsgBox "This name is not found.", vbCritical, "Not found" 
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End If 
Call Update_L_q__ Set_Size_AQtbl(kr, "Del") 
Me.cmdSave.Enabled =False 
Me.cmdCancel.Enabled = False 
Me.cmdEdit.Enabled = False 
Me.cmdDelete.Enabled =False 
Me.cmdAdd.Enabled = True 
Me.cmdClose.Enabled = True 
Me.cmdSearch.Enabled = True 




Private Sub cmdEdit Click() 
Dim myCriteria As String 
Dim Old rec As KRDB rec 
- -
Dim New rec As KRDB rec 
- -
myCriteria = "recNo=" & CurrentRecNo 
If Found Then 
If Trim(Me.txtName) <> "" And Trim(Mc.txtSalary) <> '"' And 
Trim(Me.cmbGender) <> "" And Trim(Me.cmbDept) <> "" And Trim(Me.cmbLevel) 
<>''"Then 
IflsNumeric(Me.txtName) Or Not IsNumeric(Me.txtSalary) Then 







.Fields!empName = Me.txtName 
.Fields!Gender = Me.cmbGender 
.Fields!Dept = Me.cmbDept 
.Fields!Level = Me.cmbLevel 





If Not .NoMatch Then 
Old_rec.ca(O) = .Fields!caO 
Old_rec.ca(l) =.Fields! cal 
Old_rec.ca(2) = .Fields!ca2 
Old rec.Sal = .Fields!Salary 
.Edit 
.Fields! Salary = Me. txtSalary 




.Fields!caO = "2" 
End Select 
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.Fields!cal = "2" 
Case "PE" 
.Fields!cal = "3" 
End Select 
Select Case Me.cmbLevel 
Case "BSc" 
.Fields !ca2 = "I" 
Case "MSc" 
.Fields!ca2 = "2" 
Case "PhD" 
.Fields!ca2 = "3" 
End Select 
New rec.ca(O) = .Fields!caO 
New rec.ca(l) = .Fields!cal 
New rec.ca(2) = .Fields!ca2 
New_rec.Sal =.Fields! Salary 
If New rec.ca(O) <> Old rec.ca(O) Or 
- - -
New_rec.ca(l) <> Old_rec.ca(l) Or_ 
New rec.ca(2) <>Old rec.ca(2) Or 
- - -
New rec.Sal <>Old rec.Sal Then 
- -
Call Update_L_q_Set_Size_AQtbl(Old_rec, "Del") 
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Else 
Call Update_ L _ q_ Set_ Size _AQtbl(New _rec, "Add") 
MsgBox "Data is modified", vblnformation, "Edit Data" 
MsgBox "Data is not changed", vbCritical, "Edit Data" 







Me.cmdClose.Enabled = True 










MsgBox "Data is incomplete.", vbCritieal, "Incomplete Data" 





MsgBox "This name is not found.", vbCritical, "Not Found" 
Endlf 
Me.txtName.Text = '"' 
EraseTextBoxes 





Me.cmdC!ose.Enabled = True 
Me.cmdSearch.Enabled = True 
Me.cmdAdd.SetFocus 
End Sub 
Private Sub cmdSave Click() 
On Error Resume Next 
Dim myRecNo As Integer 
Dim kr As KRDB rec 
If Trim(Me.txtName) <> "" And Trim(Me.txtSalary) <> "" And 
Trim(Me.cmbGender) <>""And Trim(Me.cmbDept) <>""And Trim(Me.cmbLevel) 
<> ••u Then 
If IsNumeric(Me.txtName) Or Not lsNumeric(Me.txtSalary) Then 






If .Record Count = 0 Then 
myRecNo = .RecordCount + 1 
Else 
myRecNo = .Fields!recNo + 1 
Endlf 
.AddNew 
.Fields!recNo = myRecNo 
.Fields!empName = Me.txtName 
.Fields!Gender = Me.cmbGender 
.Fields!Dept = Me.cmbDept 
.Fields!Level = Me.cmbLevel 





.Fields!recNo = myRecNo 
.Fields!Salary = Me.txtSalary 




.Fields!caO = "2" 
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End Select 




.Fields!cal = "2" 
Case "PE" 
.Fields!cal = "3" 
End Select 




.Fields!ca2 = "2" 
Case "PhD" 
.Fields!ca2 = "3" 
End Select 
kr.ca(O) = .Fields!caO 
kr.ca(l) = .Fields!cal 
kr.ca(2) = .Fields!ca2 
kr.Sal = .Fields!Salary 
.Update 
End With 
Call Update_L_q_Set_Size_AQtbl(kr, "Add") 
MsgBox "Data is saved", vblnformation, "Save Data" 
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Me.cmdAdd.Enabled = True 
Me.cmdClose.Enabled = True 




MsgBox "Data is incomplete.", vbCritical, "Incomplete Data" 




Private Sub cmdSearch_Click() 
Dim myName As String 
myName = InputBox("Enter Employee name you want:", "Search Name") 
IfSearchName(myName) =True Then 
Me.cmdSave.Enabled =False 
Me.cmdCancel.Enabled = True 
Me.cmdEdit.Enabled = True 
Me.cmdDelete.Enabled = True 
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Me.cmdAdd.Enabled = False 




Me.cmdSave.Enabled = False 
Me.cmdCancel.Enabled = False 
Me.cmdEdit.Enabled =False 
Me.cmdDelete.Enabled =False 
Me.cmdAdd.Enabled = True 
Me.cmdClose.Enabled =True 




C.3 Browse Employee Data Form 
Private Sub cmdClose _Click() 
Unload Me 
End Sub 
Private Sub cmdRefresh Click() 


























































Private Sub lstSalary _Click() 
Me.lstRecN o. Selected(Me.lstSalary. Listlndex) = True 
Me.lstName.Selected(Me.lstSalary.Listlndex) =True 
Me.lstGender.Selected(Me.lstSalary.Listlndex) =True 
Me.lstDept.Selected(Me.lstSalary.Listlndex) =o True 
Me.lstLevel.Selected(Me.lstSalary.Listlndex) =True 
End Sub 
C.4 Browse KRDB Form 
Private Sub cmdClose _Click() 
Unload Me 
End Sub 
Private Sub cmdRefresh Click() 





Do While Not .EOF 
Me.lstRecNo.Addltem .Fields!recNo 







Private Sub lstCategoryKeys _Click() 
Me.lstRecNo.Selected(Me.lstCategoryKeys.Listlndex) =True 
End Sub 
Private Sub lstRecNo Click() 
Me.lstCategoryKeys.Selected(Me.lstRecNo.Listlndex) =True 
End Sub 
C.S Browse AQ Table Form 
Private Sub cmdC!ose_ Click(Index As Integer) 
Unload Me 
End Sub 
Private Sub 1st_ L _ q_ set_ size_ Click() 
Me.lstKRQ.Selected(Me.lst_ L _ q_ set_ size.Listlndex) = True 
Me.lstNS.Selected(Me.lst_ L_ q_set_size.Listlndex) = True 
Me.lst_ q_set_size.Selected(Me.lst_ L_ q_set_ size.Listlndex) = True 
End Sub 
Private Sub 1st_ q_ set_size _Click() 
Me.lstKRQ.Selected(Me.lst_ q_ set_ size.Listlndex) = True 
Me.lstNS.Selected(Me.lst_q_set_size.Listlndex) =True 
Me.lst_ L _ q_set_size.Selected(Me.lst_ q_ set_ size.Listlndex) = True 
End Sub 
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Private Sub lstKRQ_ Click() 
Me.lstNS.Selected(Me.lstKRQ.Listlndex) =True 
Me.lst_ g_ set_ size.Selected(Me.lstKRQ.Listlndex) = True 
Me.lst_L_g_set_ size.Selected(Me.lstKRQ.Listlndex) =True 
End Sub 
Private Sub lstNS _Click() 
Me.lstKRQ.Selected(Me.lstNS.Listlndex) =True 
Me.lst_g_set_size.Selected(Me.lstKRQ.Listlndex) =True 
Me.lst_L _g_set_size.Selected(Me.lstNS.Listlndex) =True 
End Sub 
C.6 User Query Form 
Private Sub chki_NSO_l_Click() 
lfMe.chkl NSO !.Value= I Then 
- -




Private Sub chki_NS0_2_Click() 
lfMe.chkl NSO 2.Value =I Then 
- -




Private Sub chki_NSI_l_Click() 
IfMe.chkl NSI !.Value= I Then 
- -
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Private Sub chki_NS1_2_Click() 
IfMe.chkl NSI 2.Value =I Then 
- -




Private Sub chk I_ NS2 _I_ Click() 
IfMe.chkl NS2 !.Value= I Then 
- -




Private Sub chk I_ NS2 _ 2 _Click() 
IfMe.chkl NS2 2.Value =I Then 
- -




Private Sub chk2 _ NSO _I_ Click() 
IfMe.chk2 NSO !.Value= 1 Then 
- -




Private Sub chk2 NSO 2 Click() 
- --
IfMe.chk2 NSO 2.Value= 1 Then 
- -
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Me.chk2_NSO_l.Value = 0 
End If 
End Sub 
Private Sub chk2 _ NS 1_1_ Click() 
IfMe.chk2_NSI_l.Value =I Then 




Private Sub chk2_NS1_2_Click() 
IfMe.chk2_NS1_2.Value =I Then 




Private Sub chk2 _ NS2 _I_ Click() 
IfMe.chk2_NS2_l.Valuc =I Then 




Private Sub chk2 NS2 2 Click() 
- --
IfMe.chk2_NS2_2.Value =I Then 




Private Sub chk3 _ NSO _I Click() 
IfMe.chk3_NSO_l.Value =I Then 
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Private Sub chk3 _NSO _ 2 _Click() 
IfMe.chk3 NSO 2.Value = I Then 
- -




Private Sub chk3 _ NS 1_1_ Click() 
IfMe.chk3 NSl !.Value= I Then 
- -




Private Sub chk3_NS1_2_Click() 
IfMe.chk3 NSI 2.Value =I Then 
- -




Private Sub chk3 _ NS2 _I_ Click() 
IfMe.chk3 NS2 !.Value= 1 Then 
- -




Private Sub chk3_NS2_2_Click() 
IfMe.chk3 NS2 2.Value= I Then 
- -
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Private Sub chk4_NSO_l_ Click() 
IfMe.chk4 NSO !.Value= I Then 
- -




Private Sub chk4 NSO 2 Click() 
- --
IfMe.chk4 NSO 2.Value =I Then 
- -




Private Sub chk4_NSI_l_Click() 
IfMe.chk4 NSl !.Value= I Then 
- -




Private Sub chk4_NSI_2_Click() 
IfMe.chk4 NSI 2.Value =I Then 
- -




Private Sub chk4_NS2_l_Click() 
IfMe.chk4 NS2 !.Value= I Then 
- -
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Private Sub chk4_NS2_2_Click() 
IfMe.chk4 NS2 2.Value =I Then 
- -




Private Sub chk5 _ NSO _I_ Click() 
IfMe.chk5 NSO !.Value= I Then 
- -




Private Sub chk5_NS0_2_Click() 
lfMe.chk5 NSO 2.Value =I Then 
- -




Private Sub chk5 _ NS 1_1_ Click() 
IfMe.chk5 NSI !.Value= I Then 
- -




Private Sub chk5_NSI_2_Click() 
lfMe.chk5 NSI 2.Value =I Then 
- -
167 




Private Sub chk5 NS2 I Click() 
- --
IfMe.chk5 NS2 !.Value= I Then 
- -




Private Sub chk5 NS2 2 Click() 
- --
IfMe.chk5 NS2 2.Value =I Then 
- -




Private Sub cmb I Dept Click() 
- -
IfMe.cmbi_Dept.List(Me.cmbi_Dept.Listlndex) ="*"Then 
Me.chkl NSI !.Value= 0 
- -




Private Sub cmbl Gender Click() 
- -
If Me.cmb I_ Gender.List(Me.cmb I_ Gender.Listlndex) = "*" Then 
Me.chkl NSO !.Value= 0 
- -





Private Sub cmb I Level Click() 
- -
If Me.cmb I_ Level.List(Me.cmb I_ Level.Listlndex) = "*" Then 
Me.chkl NS2 !.Value= 0 
- -




Private Sub cmbl_Op_Click() 
Me. txt I VI. Text = '"' 
Me. txt! V2.Text = "" 
IfMe.cmbi_Op.List(Me.cmbl_Op.Listlndex) ="*"Then 
Me. txt! Vl.Visible =False 







Me.txtl VI. Visible= True 
Me. txt I V2.Visible =False 
ElselfMe.cmbl_Op.List(Me.cmbl_Op.Listlndex) ="[,]"Or_ 
Me.cmbi_Op.List(Me.cmbl_Op.Listlndex) ="(,]"Or_ 
Me.cmb I_ Op.List(Me.cmbl_ Op.Listlndex) = "[,)" Or_ 
Me.cmb I_ Op.List(Me.cmb I_ Op.Listlndex) = "(,)" Then 
Me.txtl Vl.Visible =True 
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Me.txtl V2.Visible =True 
End If 
End Sub 
Private Sub cmd 1_ Or_ Click() 
If Part! Validation= False Then 
Exit Sub 
End If 
Parts ctr = Parts ctr + I 
- -
Fill_krqO 
Me.txt2 Vl.Visible =False 
Me.txt2 V2. Visible= False 
Me.chk2 NSO !.Value= 0 
- -
Me.chk2 NSO 2.Value = 0 
- -
Me.chk2 NSI !.Value= 0 
- -
Me.chk2 NSI 2.Value = 0 
- -
Me.chk2 NS2 !.Value= 0 
- -
Me.chk2 NS2 2.Value = 0 
- -
Me.chk2 NSO !.Visible= True 
- -
Me.chk2 NSO 2.Visible =True 
- -
Me.chk2 NS 1 !.Visible= True 
- -
Me.chk2 NSI 2.Visible =True 
- -
Me.chk2 NS2 !.Visible= True 
- -
Me.chk2 NS2 2.Visible =True 
- -
Me.cmd2 Cancel. Visible= True 
Me.cmb2 Gender. Visible= True 
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Me.cmb2_Dept.Visible =True 
Me.cmb2 Level. Visible= True 
Me.cmb2_0p.Visible =True 
Me.cmd2 Or. Visible= True 
Me.h L4.Visible =True 
Me.chk2 NSO I = 0 
- -
Me.chk2 NSO 2 = 0 
- -
Me.cmb2 Gender. Text="" 
Me.chk2 NSI I = 0 
- -
Me.chk2 NSI 2 = 0 
- -
Me.cmb2_Dept.Text = "" 
Me.chk2 NS2 l = 0 
- -
Me.chk2 NS2 2 = 0 
- -
Me.cmb2 Level. Text="" 
Me.cmb2 _ Op.Text = '"' 
Me.txt2 VI. Text="" 
Me.txt2 V2.Text = "" 
Me.cmb2 Gender.SetFocus 
Me.cmdl Or.Enabled =False 
Me.cmdBrowseResult.Enabled = False 
End Sub 
Private Sub cmd2_Cancel_Click() 
Dim Answer As String 
If Parts ctr > 2 Then 
If Parts ctr = 3 Then 
171 
MsgBox "You have to remove (Part 3) before removing this part.", vbCritical, 
"Removing the current part" 
Exit Sub 
End If 
IfParts ctr = 4 Then 
MsgBox "You have to remove (Part 4 and Part 3) before removing this part.", 
vbCritical, "Removing the current part" 
Exit Sub 
End If 
If Parts ctr = 5 Then 
MsgBox "You have to remove (Part 5, Part 4, and Part 3) before removing this 




Answer= MsgBox("Are you sure you want to remove this part (Part 2) from your 
query?", vb Y esNo + vbQuestion, "Removing the current part") 
If Answer= vb Yes Then 
Parts ctr = Parts ctr - I 
- -
Me.chk2 NSO I. Visible = False 
- -
Me.chk2 NSO 2.Visible =False 
- -
Me.chk2 NS I I. Visible= False 
- -
Me.chk2 NS I 2.Visible =False 
- -
Me.chk2 NS2 !.Visible= False 
- -
Me.chk2 NS2 2.Visible =False 
- -
Me.cmdl Or.Enabled =True 
Me.cmdBrowseResult.Enabled =False 
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Me.cmd I Or.SetFocus 
Me.cmd2 Cancel. Visible= False 
Me.cmb2 Gender. Visible= False 
Me.cmb2 _Dept. Visible = False 
Me.cmb2 Level. Visible= False 
Me.cmb2_0p.Visible =False 
Me.txt2 Vl.Visible =False 
Me.txt2 V2.Visible =False 
Me.cmd2 Or. Visible = False 





Private Sub cmdBrowseResult Click() 
frmBrowseQueryResult.Show 
Me.cmdBrowseResult.Enabled = False 
End Sub 
Private Sub cmdClear_Click() 
Me.Cls 
End Sub 
Private Sub cmdBrwoseAQtbl Click() 
On Error Go To Err Handler 
With Me.datAQ table.Recordset 
.MoveFirst 
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Do While Not .EOF 
frmBrowse AQ tbl.lstKRQ.Addltem .Fields!caO & .Fields!cal & .Fields!ca2 
&!t.tl 
& .Fields!Op & "." & .Fields!Vl & "." & .Fields!V2 
frmBrowse_AQ_tbl.lstNS.Addltem .Fields!NSO & .Fields!NSI & .Fields!NS2 
frmBrowse _ AQ_ tbl.lst_ q_ set_ size.Addltem .Fields! q_ set_ size 




frmBrowse AQ tbl.Show 
Exit Sub 
Err Handler: 
If Err = 3021 Then 
MsgBox "Sorry Audit Query Table is empty now.", vblnformation, "AQ Table" 
End If 
End Sub 
Private Sub cmdExit_ Click() 
Unload Me 
End Sub 
Private Sub cmdNewQuery _Click() 
Me. txt! VI. Visible= False 
Me. txt! V2.Visible =False 
Me.cmdBrowseResult.Enabled =False 
Me.cmdl Or.Enabled =True 
Parts ctr = I 
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Me.chkl NSO !.Value= 0 
- -
Me.chkl NSO 2.Value = 0 
- -
Me.chkl NSI !.Value= 0 
- -
Me.chkl NSI 2.Value = 0 
- -
Me.chkl NS2 !.Value= 0 
- -
Me.chkl NS2 2.Value = 0 
- -
Me.chk2 NSO !.Visible= False 
- -
Me.chk2 NSO 2.Visible =False 
- -
Me.chk2 NS I !.Visible= False 
- -
Me.chk2 NS I 2.Visible =False 
- -
Me.chk2 NS2 !.Visible= False 
- -
Me.chk2 NS2 2.Visible =False 
- -
Me.cmd2 Cancel. Visible= False 
Me.cmb2 Gender. Visible = False 
Me.cmb2_Dept.Visible =False 
Me.cmb2 Level. Visible= False 
Me.cmb2_0p.Visible =False 
Me.txt2 Vl.Visible =False 
Me.txt2 V2.Visible =False 
Me.cmd2 Or. Visible= False 
Me.chk3 NSO !.Visible= False 
- -
Me.chk3 NSO 2.Visible =False 
- -
Me.chk3 NS I !.Visible= False 
- -
Me.chk3 NS I 2.Visible =False 
- -
Me.chk3 NS2 !.Visible= False 
- -
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Me.chk3 NS2 2.Visible =False 
- -
Me.cmd3 Cancel. Visible= False 
Me.cmb3 Gender. Visible= False 
Me.cmb3 Dept. Visible= False 
Me.cmb3 Level. Visible= False 
Me.cmb3 Op.Visible =False 
Me.txt3 Vl.Visible =False 
Me.txt3 V2.Visible =False 
Me.cmd3 Or. Visible= False 
Me.chk4 NSO !.Visible= False 
- -
Me.chk4 NSO 2.Visible =False 
- -
Me.chk4 NSI !.Visible= False 
- -
Me.chk4 NSI 2.Visible =False 
- -
Me.chk4 NS2 !.Visible= False 
- -
Me.chk4 NS2 2.Visible =False 
- -
Me.cmd4 Cancel. Visible= False 
Me.cmb4 Gender. Visible= False 
Me.cmb4_Dept.Visible =False 
Me.cmb4 Level. Visible= False 
Me.cmb4_0p.Visible =False 
Me.txt4 Vl.Visible =False 
Me.txt4 V2.Visible =False 
Me.cmd4 Or. Visible= False 
Me.chk5 NSO !.Visible= False 
- -
Me.chk5 NSO 2.Visible =False 
- -
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Me.chk5 NSl !.Visible= False 
- -
Me.chk5 NSl 2.Visible =False 
- -
Me.chk5 NS2 !.Visible= False 
- -
Me.chk5 NS2 2.Visible =False 
- -
Me.cmd5 Cancel. Visible = False 
Me.cmb5 Gender. Visible= False 
Me.cmb5 _Dept. Visible= False 
Me.cmb5 Level. Visible= False 
Me.cmb5 _Op.Visible =False 
Me.txt5 Vl.Visible =False 
Me.txt5 V2.Visible =False 
Me.h L4.Visible =False 
Me.h L5.Visible =False 
Me.h L6.Visible =False 
Me.h L7.Visible =False 
Me.chkl NSO I = 0 
- -
Me.chkl NSO 2 = 0 
- -
Me.cmbl Gender. Text='"' 
Me.chkl NSI I= 0 
- -
Me.chkl NSI 2 = 0 
- -
Me.cmbl_Dept.Text = "" 
Me.chkl NS2 I = 0 
- -
Me.chkl NS2 2 = 0 
- -
Me.cmbl Level. Text="" 
Me.cmbl_Op.Text = "" 
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Me.txt1 Vl.Text = "" 
Me.txt1 V2.Text = "" 
Me.cmbl Gender.SetFocus 
For x = 0 To no of _parts- 1 
For y = 0 To 2 
krq(x).ca(y) = "" 
krq(x).NS(y) = 0 
Nexty 
krq(x).Op = "" 
krq(x).V1 = 0 
krq(x).V2 = 0 
Part_ Size(x) = 0 
Nextx 
End Sub 
Private Sub cmdQueryResult Click() 
Dim Part _Index As Integer 
For x = 0 To (no_of_parts- 1) 
Fory = 0 To 2 
krq(x).ca(y) = "" 
krq(x).NS(y) = 0 
Next y 
krq(x).Op = "" 
krq(x).V1 = 0 
krq(x).V2 = 0 






If Parts ctr = I Then 
IfPartl Validation= False Then 




Elself Parts ctr = 2 Then 










Elself Parts ctr = 3 Then 
If Part! Validation= False Then 















Elseif Parts ctr = 4 Then 





















Else if Parts ctr = 5 Then 
If Part! Validation= False Then 
Me.cmb I Gender.SetF ocus 
Exit Sub 
End If 































For Part_ Index= 0 To (Parts_ctr- I) 
Call Select_Recs(krq(Part_Index), Part_Index) 
Next Part Index 
frmBrowseQueryResult.txtSum = q_Sum 
frmBrowseQueryResult.txtCount = q_ Count 
Call Check_ the_ Query 
Me.cmdBrowseResult.Enabled = True 
182 
End Sub 
C.7 Browse Query Result Form 
Private Sub cmdClose ~Click() 
Unload Me 
End Sub 
Private Sub lstCategoryKeys Click() 
Me.lstRecNo.Selected(Me.lstCategoryKeys.Listlndex) =True 
End Sub 
Private Sub lstRecNo~Click() 
Me.lstCategoryKeys.Selected(Me.lstRecNo.Listlndex) =True 
End Sub 
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